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1760-1822

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

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

It is generally agreed to-day that an historical education, however slight the pressure of other subjects may force it to be, must include two distinct elements. There must be, on the one hand, a broad general survey of historical development, and the modern tendency is wholly to be applauded which insists on the broadening of this survey to the utmost practicable limits, and including within it not only the history of our own country, nor even only the history of our own continent, but some general sketch, however rapid, of the whole development of mankind.

At the same time it is recognised that such a general survey is, by itself, an inadequate historical education, for it inevitably neglects the clash of personalities and the finer interplay of cause and effect. It is necessary to turn aside on occasions from the outline, and study in comparative detail a selected special period. One of the most masterly outlines ever composed was Guizot's course of lectures on the *History of Civilisation in Europe*; but it is said that Sainte-Beuve, after reading it, took down a volume of Memoirs to remind himself "how history was really made." The anecdote illustrates the need for supplementing 'outlines' with 'special periods.'

Many examining bodies recognise this need by de-

manding knowledge both of an outline and of a special period.

This series of books is designed to meet the needs of classes studying 'special periods' in the upper and middle forms of schools. In certain respects the series challenges comparison with the well-known series of 'Epochs' published by Longmans thirty or forty years ago. But the present series of volumes will be rather shorter and simpler in style. Whereas the volumes in Longmans' series were largely written by professorial experts, these will be mostly written by working teachers in schools, who know not only their subjects, but also the needs, the tastes, and, above all, the weaknesses of their pupils. The aim of the writers will be to produce not merely manuals which will enable candidates to pass examinations, but also books which will arouse the disinterested curiosity of the average boy and girl.

INTRODUCTORY

All history is a story of change. Perhaps historians are sometimes inclined to exaggerate the importance of the changes in the periods of which they are writing. But it is hardly possible to find any epoch in British history where changes were as various, as deep, and as pregnant for the future as in the sixty years covered by this book.

Foreign Policy. In foreign policy, it is true, a striking continuity prevails. That great and terrible duel between Great Britain and France still dominates the scene, as it had dominated it almost continuously since 1688. In 1760 this country, "the terror of the world," as Chatham said, was preparing by hammer strokes her greatest triumph over the house of Bourbon; in 1820 she was uneasily resting after the final victory of Waterloo. Yet in the course of and in consequence of the struggle British destinies were profoundly changed. She lost the original Empire founded and peopled by her own stock, she acquired a double-headed successor in Canada and India, whereby she was brought into far closer relations with the United States than any other European country, and became the greatest Mohammedan power in the world and the persistent rival of Russia. Moreover, it was in these years that she began systematically to acquire that ring of strategic naval and commercial stations round the world which has both affirmed her supremacy in those spheres and multiplied her imperial responsibilities. It is a foolish saying that "England conquered half the world in a fit of

absence of mind," but it is true that she had not yet fully realised the character of her Empire or the extent of its commitments.

Political and Constitutional Life. If we turn to home affairs we cannot help noticing an odd one-sidedness in the change. Political life and the structure and character of the constitution seem almost the same at the end as at the beginning. Certainly the party system has tightened, and we are no longer perplexed with all the confusing factions which darkened the course of politics up to the advent of the younger Pitt. The position of the Prime Minister has been more clearly defined, the personnel and duties of the Cabinet have been stripped of a good deal of vagueness. The Crown has receded some steps farther into the background of power since the days when George II. said with penetration that the constitution might be a good one, but not for the King. Only one rotten borough—the notorious Grampound—had been suppressed; there had been no addition to or simplification of the confused and restricted body which sent representatives to Westminster. Similarly, the legal system remained practically unaltered, or, if altered at all, tended towards an increased, though useless, severity in criminal cases. The law still stood in the same general relation towards religious toleration in which it had been left by the compromise of William III.'s reign. Local government still hung precariously on the obsolete frame of the Elizabethan system. So in this sphere, if we see change at all, it is at most a gentle and almost imperceptible evolution. It is, in truth, a good illustration of the rule that political and constitutional change is the reflection, and sometimes the slow reflection, of social and economic change. It was the latter which sowed the seeds of the political harvest, whose first-fruits were to be seen in 1832.

Social and Economic Changes. England was still in 1760 predominantly an agricultural country, with a small population of under 7,000,000, with no great town except London, and with the large majority of her people settled south of the Trent. The roads were still unmetalled, many in fact were simply pack-horse tracks ; a very large extent of the country was still unenclosed, for the hedges which we now think of as the unique distinction of our countryside, when we come home from abroad, were the exception rather than the rule. The relation between classes still seemed to be stationary and, on the whole, harmonious. Town and country faded into one another and completed each other. Manufactures, as the name implies, were still the work of the hand ; much was still done in the cottage, very little in great buildings, where either sex of every age, herded together, were naturally described as "hands," whose monotonous task was to feed the insatiable machine.

By 1820 the population had nearly doubled, the North already outnumbered the South, the shifting of the new generation from the village and country town to the great and crowded industrial areas had gone far. Where the accident of nature had placed water, coal, and iron in close proximity the desert began to reek like the pit. Wealth increased enormously in spite of the great war, or in some cases because of it ; but the inequalities in its distribution were enormously increased. The proportion of peasants to town-workmen had largely diminished, as had the proportion among the peasant class who had their own "stake in the country." The enclosures provided new estates for the new rich, who thus set the seal on their gentility, and deprived the poor of their common rights. The ruinous price of wheat, due to the double number of mouths to feed and to the Napoleonic wars, robbed the country dweller of

the last of his independence. Thus from the placidity and stability of relations between classes in 1760 there emerged a double form of radicalism, almost amounting to a class war: first, of the country against the machines and the new aristocracy, which was really a kind of conservatism in revolt, typified by Cobbett with his incessant invectives against the manufacturing interest and London "the great wen"; secondly, of the unrepresented and exploited town operatives against a political system which denied them rights, and which in 1794 had declared it to be high treason to agitate for "a representative government," and against an economic system which, by refusing to allow combination, forced them to work in laborious poverty for the benefit of a system rather than of an individual.

Thus England was profoundly changed both in the heart and the face. The "Black Country" was beginning, the hedges were everywhere filling in the countryside, the great turnpikes were being built, the coach was superseding the pack-animal, a network of canals was opening out and expediting heavy inland traffic. Everywhere by 1822 appeared the signs of the industrial and economic revolution, no longer in its infancy, but in its young maturity, awaiting only the advent of the steam locomotive to redouble the rate of its accelerating progress.

Essential Conservatism of English Character. Yet while we emphasise the importance of these changes, it is well also not to forget the permanence of spirit which lay behind them. The revolution in environment did not make the average Englishman a revolutionary; the example of the French Revolution, in fact, made him essentially more conservative. While he wanted many things which he was determined to get at the end of the period, he wanted them, as Cromwell used to say, "in a free, not a forced way." Moreover, the last thing that he desired was to destroy

wholesale either the constitution or the social order in the interests of some assumed pattern of abstract perfection. On the contrary, he desired to dovetail the new in with the old, preserving as far as may be the structure of the old building, not despising but extolling the spirit of compromise.

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CHAPTER I

THE YOUNG KING, PITT, AND PARLIAMENT

THE accession of George III. was of much greater importance in home than in foreign politics. It did not, it is true, mark the death of Jacobitism, which even before the '45 had faded from a practical creed into a sentimental preference. But it gave the naturally Tory mind a King towards whom it could look without distaste. No one could think of the young King as either a foreigner or a usurper. As he "gloried in the name of Briton," so his character reflected to a surprising degree that of the average Englishman. Simple in his tastes, fond of his farm and his boiled mutton, with no suspicious intellectual refinements, his defects united with his good qualities to gain him popularity. If irascible, he was hearty and accessible; if narrow-minded and obstinate, he was also courageous. England, in short, for the first time since the time of Anne had a thoroughly national sovereign.

Young men of his character placed in the highest seat are not easy superiors. Pitt was a man of genius, fully conscious of his powers, in the full flood of domestic ascendancy and foreign victory. George found his deferential manner of almost oriental obsequiousness the more trying as it was coupled with the assumption that he would always get his own way. With this portentous mentor and advisor he could never carry out his mother's advice, "George, be a king." He realised that if he could substitute a nonentity

as Prime Minister, revive in the House of Commons a Tory party attached to him by favour, management, and corruption, he could overthrow the supremacy of the Whig oligarchs. Thus he hoped to go back in reality to the conditions of 1688, and by reviving the royal influence reassert the royal initiative, which the Whigs had been insidiously destroying for the last two generations. Bolingbroke had dreamed of the " Patriot King," who would govern a happy nation without party. George, by reviving a King's party, believed that the nation would believe that it was not a party at all.

George, who knew that the House of Commons was ready to his hand, soon found his nonentity in Lord Bute, a handsome and elegant Scot, a pet of the Princess-mother, who had the perfect courtier's quality of being supple and insolent at the right moments. He soon also found his opportunity in a crisis of the war, whose triumphs were already becoming staled by familiarity.

Pitt's Resignation and War with Spain. Pitt had information, subsequently justified, that Spain intended to make common cause with her fellow Bourbon power, and to renew what was called the Family Compact. He wished, therefore, to seize her treasure-ships, whose safe advent from the New World she was awaiting in 1761 before showing her hand. The Cabinet refused and Pitt resigned. His predictions were fulfilled, and war with Spain followed. The great machine which he had created—perhaps the most perfect ever forged in England for war—achieved the purpose of its designer. The unwieldy body of Spain was punched all over the world; Florida, Havana, and Manila fell before British sea-power.

The Peace of Paris, 1763. As in 1713, the Tory party made a peace in the height of victory, which has sometimes been criticised as incommensurate with the achieve-

ments of the war. But it is a singular fortune for any country to be able to consider such results as a moderate reward. France ceded all her possessions in North America, with various West Indian islands and Senegal in West Africa, while Spain lost Florida. Moreover, British sovereignty was replanted in Minorca, that valuable base which threatened the naval power of the two Bourbon kingdoms on the Mediterranean. In India we stood beyond question as the paramount European power.

Troubles at Home. Peace abroad did not, however, bring placidity at home. John Wilkes, a low but rather amusing Member of Parliament, a type never absent from popular assemblies, succeeded in discrediting both the Ministry and the House of Commons, which he had satirised in his stinging little paper *The North Briton*. Halifax, the Secretary of State, was so ill-advised as to arrest him for a seditious libel under what was called a general warrant. The judges declared this to be illegal, first, because the Secretary of State had no power to issue a warrant; secondly, because a warrant in which no names were mentioned was not a warrant at all. Thus the liberty of the subject was further secured by the abolition of this obsolete survival from Star Chamber usage, and the London mob shouted uproariously for "Wilkes and Liberty." The House of Commons made itself ridiculous by following the lead of the court by voting that his paper was a seditious libel, and expelling its author. Five years later, in 1769, the next Parliament fell into a more serious trap when it annulled the demagogue's election, and declared his opponent, Colonel Luttrell, to be elected, though he had polled only a quarter of the votes given to his rival. This was not the first time that the House of Commons had broken the law for its own selfish advantage since 1688, but it was the most cynical and far-reaching instance.

Every freeholder felt that his right to vote was dependent on the convenience of a corrupt assembly.

Grenville and the Stamp Act. Meanwhile a little cloud was arising out of the clear sky of the peace itself, which was within a few years to darken the whole sky, to overturn many ministries, to establish and then to ruin the King's system of personal government, and to destroy a great empire. George had got rid of Pitt, but he could not get his own way. The " factions " were too strong for him. Bute had resigned after little more than a year of office ; his skin was not thick enough to bear the venomous abuse and innuendo which the public dislike shot at him. George Grenville, Pitt's brother-in-law, a long-winded and self-satisfied pedant, was imposed on the King as his successor. He was faced with the problem, with which we are painfully familiar, of paying for a victorious war conducted without regard to expense. Grenville, like everyone else, naturally desired to see the American colonists make a contribution. They had been delivered from that great thorn in their side, the French military power in Canada, and they had done little enough to help towards their own deliverance. However, to desire a contribution is a different thing from imposing a tax. He was not, it is true, anxious to impose a tax. He would have preferred, as he told the Americans, that they should voluntarily contribute. But there was no disposition from them either jointly or severally to agree to the just desire of the mother country. Therefore he fell back after considerable negotiations on the less preferred alternative. The tax created by the famous Stamp Act of 1765 was but a small one producing £100,000 per annum, but it raised an immense question of principle, quite unexpected by its author and the House of Commons.

The Opposing Arguments. Now it is impossible to say

that the tax was illegal, for there was nothing on the Statute Book forbidding Parliament to tax the Colonies. It cannot even be described by the vague term of unconstitutional, for the sovereignty of the King in Parliament was the most prized article of the Constitution. The tax was to be applied for the benefit of the Colonists in support of a standing army in America, to protect them against the Indians and the possibility of French revenge. It might reasonably be considered as more directly in the Colonial interest than the duties so long imposed by Parliament without American opposition for the regulation of Colonial trade.

Yet, in spite of these considerations, there were numbers of people in England from Pitt downwards who not only sympathised with but passionately admired the conduct of the Americans in resisting this tax. No Whig could indeed agree with the Colonists in the distinction which they drew between allegiance to the Crown and submission to Parliament. But it was gradually felt that, whatever the letter of the law, a real difference was observable between indirect taxation for the regulation of trade and direct taxation for raising revenue. Moreover, it is hardly for a generation which supported or acquiesced in the Parliament Act of 1911 to assert that Pitt's distinction between the legislative and taxative powers of Parliament is meaningless. Pitt maintained that the power of Parliament to make laws was one thing. He upheld to the full the legislative supremacy of Parliament over America. But the right to tax he declared is quite different. The essence of taxation is that it is a free gift made through representatives. Therefore he contended that it was a contradiction in terms for Parliament to make a free gift of the money of the unrepresented Americans. The theory of the Parliament Act of 1911 seems to be analogous. The

House of Lords is regarded as representing itself alone, and therefore ought to be deprived of any power of interfering with the grants made by the representative House of Commons. Again, while it was true that the majority of taxpayers in England paid their taxes without being represented in Parliament, yet common sense agreed with Pitt's assertion that they were "virtually represented" in a sense inapplicable to their kinsmen 3000 miles beyond seas. Again, if the essence of representative institutions is the control of the purse, why give the Americans such institutions and then deny them the logical consequence of the gift?

As we know now, the Stamp Act, which was immediately withdrawn, was not the cause of the American War of Independence. The real issue, at present imperfectly realised by either side, was this: Was it on balance in the interests of the Colonists to continue to acknowledge British Sovereignty? It has been said that the Peace of Paris was the cause of American independence, and there is much truth in this view. While a powerfully organised enemy was at their gate, union with Great Britain for defence was a necessity, even though they refused the British suggestions to unite themselves for the purpose. But with the removal of the menace the obvious need for any externally imposed unity, with its inevitable drawbacks, also departed. They felt every breath of grievance the more keenly as they were so nearly free, so nearly self-governed. Their freedom and self-government was infinitely greater than that granted or even conceived of by other European powers towards their colonists. The executive in each province was miserably weak; no one could expect that a governor would act as a tyrannical or even an efficient agent of the mother country when his salary year by year was dependent on a vote of the local

legislature. Even the restrictions on their commerce for the benefit of England were much less complete and much less one-sided than those imposed by France and Spain, or exacted by England herself from the unfortunate Irish. The Colonists were eventually prepared to face independence before achieving that self-determined unity which was the result but not the cause of the war itself.

Next year, 1766, George got rid of Grenville and found in Rockingham a far pleasanter though less able servant. He repealed the Stamp Act, but, by one of those curious compromises so beloved by Englishmen, threw a sop to his opponents by asserting in the Declaratory Act the legality of the measure which he was repealing.

During the four uneasy years which followed minister succeeded minister. Amongst them Pitt came and went, an irritable phantom of his former self, robbed of his energy and almost of his sanity by the gout, and of his popularity by his entrance into the Upper Chamber as Earl of Chatham. The factions passed in procession through office, and George was getting nearer his triumph as each ministry failed to get a grip upon either the House of Commons or the country. These years were mainly memorable for their political pamphlets, the ferocious invective in which the mysterious Junius attacked the Duke of Grafton, and the gloriously expressed political philosophy of Burke's *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*. They ended in a great experiment in constitutional reaction, the so-called personal government of George exercised through Lord North, which was to endure for thirteen unlucky years.

CHAPTER II

PERSONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN WAR

Lord North and the King. In January 1770, Lord North, who had already been two years in the Ministry, became First Lord of the Treasury as the King's nominee. He repudiated not merely the title but the real powers of Prime Minister, and regarded himself as the chief executive officer for carrying out the King's business in Parliament, and covering him with ministerial responsibility. George, in short, regained the initiative, which had been dropping out of the hand of the sovereign since the "Glorious Revolution." The King had great talents for detail and for a low type of management which placed the House of Commons under his influence or control. It is said that 194 members received Government appointments, while many more owed their seats to the money which the King spent lavishly on electoral corruption, and which drove him into heavy debts, which the Parliament paid three times with diminishing complaisance.

Lord North was a good choice. He was intensely loyal to the King and a very competent man of business. He had a truly charming nature, with an easy and happy manner, and was a master at returning that soft answer which, if it does not turn away wrath, at least partially disarms the enemy. For even in the bitterest periods of

party strife the House of Commons is attracted by a leader who eschews bitterness.

Feeling in the Country. It would be a great mistake to suppose that the royal grasp of power was unpopular in the country. Everyone was tired of the factions. Since the eclipse of Chatham no man had the eyes of the country directed towards himself. Burke was a great political philosopher, but he had none of the qualities of a leader. George knew exactly what he wanted; he had a settled policy, which in the main was actively popular with the majority of Englishmen. The whole political theatre was dominated more and more by the American question, where the ordinary man echoed the opinion of General Gage, so heartily welcomed by the King, that the Americans "will be lions only while we are lambs, but if we take the resolute part they will undoubtedly be very meek." It was only after the war dragged its inconclusive way into the disastrous European struggle that men's minds began, by a law of nature, to turn against its author and agents.

Development of the American Dispute. The Colonial dispute had already entered a new stage. The repeal of the Stamp Act had been followed by a general outburst of the loyalty of lip-service, but in reality the home Government was thought to have yielded simply to force. Therefore a higher tone was normally adopted in the many questions in dispute. Parliament's attempts to insist more strongly on the commercial regulations and to suppress the contraband trade with the French and Spanish possessions were widely resented. The Colonists now objected with increasing bitterness to any form of taxation whose aim was to produce revenue. North therefore inherited the renewed discontent which the duties reinforced by Charles Townsend, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1767, had inflamed. His own views, as might be expected from his

temperament, were for conciliation. But this did not commend itself to the King. He saw very early that far more was at stake than a money dispute ; that the mother country must take a firm stand somewhere or be gradually driven from the last ledges of power. His policy was not that of a bully ; it was that of a man who does not intend to be deprived of his strict legal rights by either evasion or intimidation. Therefore it seemed to him, and to many others, simply irrelevant to say that as the tea-duty, which after March 1770 alone survived, brought in a mere £16,000 a year it was not worth imposing. It stood for an all-important principle. Moreover, who believes that the withdrawal of the tea-duty would have pacified the Americans ? They were full of grievances : they objected to a standing army, meant for their defence ; to supplying the soldiers with the necessities of life ; to the Quebec Act of 1774, by which the Roman Catholic religion was virtually established in Canada—an act of the highest statesmanship ; they treated with a continuous and cruel persecution the very large minority of loyalists within their borders ; they objected, in short, to practically every outward and visible sign of an authority which they professed with eagerness and for the most part with sincerity that they had no thought of repudiating. " No man," said Cromwell profoundly, " goes so far as he who knows not whither he is going." That was the attitude of the Colonists. They willed the means without clearly seeing the end, and they drifted into a civil war without realising that they must receive from its decision one of the two things, subjection or independence.

The War of American Independence. The direct cause of the war was the penal measures justifiably taken by the British Government to punish the State of Massachusetts and the town of Boston for the destruction of the tea-chests

in 1773. The charter was to be remodelled, the port closed, and provision made for the quartering of troops. The Americans retaliated by summoning a "Continental Congress" of twelve out of the thirteen colonies, the first rudimentary approach towards unity. The war broke out with casual and irregular conflicts in the spring of 1775; in spite of the loyalists, estimated at one-third of the total population, it gradually became general. We need not follow the details of the struggle; civil war is always "miserrima caedes," as Virgil calls it. The Colonists, though easily discouraged, fought like brave men. Our regular officers despised their farmer adversaries, as happened also in the Boer War one hundred and twenty years later. The great distance from home, the bad communications, the vast extent of territory to be subdued, the small number of troops available, the necessity of modifying our strategy to meet the needs of the loyalists, all prevented a speedy decision. So it came about that three years passed and left the issue still doubtful. England had lost her chance of overthrowing her adversary quickly, and was soon to be contending with a number of powerful European enemies.

Death of Chatham. Europe as a whole was jealous of our country, which had been exalted in 1763 "to a height of prosperity and glory unknown to any former age," as the inscription to Chatham's memory in Westminster Abbey truly boasts. France and Spain were longing to avenge their defeats and to recover their lost possessions. For the only time in European history a voluntary continental league was made against us; the next five years were passed in frequent defeat and great jeopardy. Chatham himself died at the commencement of the struggle. His championship of the Americans had ruined his dimming influence; the King had actually described him as

a "trumpet of sedition," but his end was glorious. He appeared in the House of Lords in April 1778 to "lift up his voice against the dismemberment of this ancient and most noble monarchy. Shall this great country fall prostrate before the house of Bourbon? If we fall, let us fall like men." He fell back in a fit and was dead within a month. He remains the most spectacular and awe-inspiring of our great line of Prime Ministers. He had to the full the defects of his great qualities. His indomitable will and energy were matched by his imperiousness and arrogance. "Such language," said a colleague, "was never heard before, west of Constantinople"; but he stands out perhaps even greater in the proportion of history than he appeared to his contemporaries. Finally, he left to the country the son whom he had educated and prepared for still greater struggles and dangers: "Uno avulso non deficit alter."

Europe joins in. Too great a measure of success is always dangerous, as it encourages complaisance and neglect, whereas defeat is a stimulus. So it was in 1778. The British Navy had been allowed to decline; the ships were fewer, less seaworthy, and worse managed than in 1763, while the duties imposed upon them were much harder. The French fleet, on the contrary, was far more efficient. Their new men-of-war were built of a speed which enabled them to decline fleet actions and to cripple our ships by firing into the masts and rigging. Hence for the first time since 1688 we partially lost command of the sea. The inevitable result was complete failure in America. The northern provinces had already been lost before the war became general, by the surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga in 1777. But we had maintained and even extended our grip upon the South. Lord Cornwallis, who had far more energy and self-confidence than any other

British general, had thrust upwards into Virginia from the Carolinas, and even threatened a junction with the British forces in New York in the spring of 1781. By the autumn he was reduced to the defensive, and lay with his army in the Yorktown peninsula. Washington blockaded his landward exit, and a French fleet appeared upon the sea. Thus he was compelled to surrender, and American independence was accomplished. As a consequence the King's system was overthrown at home.

Conclusion of the War. But before home affairs are described, it is convenient to carry on the account of the war until the Peace of Versailles in 1783.

Spain had entered in 1779. She devoted her principal efforts to the siege of Gibraltar, which was desperately attacked and heroically defended for three years. Holland, our ancient ally, joined our enemies in 1780, but accomplished nothing and lost much. Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and the Empire formed what they called the "Armed Neutrality of the North." Their object was to combat our rules of maritime warfare, to insist on the freedom of neutral trade, to limit contraband of war, and to restrict blockade. It seemed, therefore, that the Baltic, whence we drew our timber and much warlike stores, would be closed against us. Yet, in spite of this tremendous array of open enemies or malevolent neutrals, the naval position gradually improved. Though Minorca was lost, the victories of Rodney and Hood restored British prestige at sea. France, heading for bankruptcy, was directed by that able realist Vergennes, who had no intention of prolonging the war for a shadow. The treaty of Versailles, unlike its famous modern namesake, was no imposed or dictated peace. It marked the one great defeat of British power in modern times, but its terms were moderate. We had already agreed with the Americans to acknowledge

their independence, and therefore the treaty merely registered a *fait accompli*. None of our other losses were of serious importance except Minorca, whose value as a naval base has already been pointed out. It seemed as if the long struggle between England and France was to be terminated with more or less even honours. A far better spirit grew up after 1783 than had animated the two nations since the Peace of Utrecht.

CHAPTER III

THE FRUITS OF DEFEAT

The Decay of the King's System. As we have seen, the policy pursued by George was for a long time popular in the country. In 1776 Burke lamented the indifference of all classes, and specially deplored the hostility of the trading classes, those old allies of Whiggism, towards the Americans; as he truly said in a vivid phrase, they had "snuffed the cadaverous *haut-goût* of a lucrative war." In Parliament the royal measures received the sanction of a majority, which often approached 200. But the King had raised up for himself a most formidable adversary in Charles James Fox, who had been dismissed from a subordinate post in the Ministry in 1774. This strange young man united in an extravagant way the most contrary qualities. He was the wildest of an age of frenzied gamblers, unusually loose in his relations with women, apparently void of any restraining principles in his private life. Yet he was an excellent and enthusiastic scholar and possessed extraordinary political gifts, which in many ways he cultivated assiduously. Unsurpassed and perhaps unequalled as an orator, he tells us himself that he spoke every day but one in five successive Parliamentary sessions. Nor was his oratory the mere sounding brass of eloquence, for the universal opinion of his contemporaries was that he had the faculty of exact reasoning to an unrivalled degree. If we add the wonderful personal charm which carried him

throughout his life over all his extravagances and violence, we can see how dangerous an enemy he was bound to become. The King's position, however, stubbornly and laboriously and corruptly defended, was but slowly undermined, even though Lord North himself admitted in a letter to the King himself that "it must end in ruin to His Majesty and the country." It is astonishing that North could have thought it consistent with his public duty to have carried on this policy for so many years.

Signs of Discontent. The feeling in the country developed more rapidly than in the House of Commons. It was said that no such years of political agitation as 1779 and 1780 had been known within living memory. A great movement arose in favour of Parliamentary reform, headed by the great and independent county of Yorkshire. The troubles in India and Ireland told against the Government. It suffered, moreover, from its good as well as its bad deeds.

The Gordon Riots. The Quebec Act, followed by a modest measure relieving English Roman Catholics of a few of their grosser burdens, revived the cry of "No Popery," which is never far from English lips. The King was absurdly compared to Charles I. and James II. In 1780 the Gordon riots, which took their name from a fanatical Scotch nobleman, placed London for four days within the control of a frenzied mob. They burnt Catholic chapels, sacked the houses of all supposed professors or favourers of that religion, broke down prisons, and, in short, created a reign of terror. It was due to George alone, who showed great bravery and initiative in this extremity, that the soldiers were authorised to deal firmly with the insurrection.

Dunning's Motion. In that same year Dunning carried in the House of Commons his famous motion "that the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and

ought to be diminished." This resolution is justly considered to be a constitutional landmark. It drew attention in a solemn way to the danger, on which Burke was never tired of enlarging, that the influence of the Crown, if unscrupulously exerted with the means of wholesale corruption to hand, might become by unsuspected degrees almost as dangerous to constitutional liberties as the old power exercised by the Stuarts openly through prerogative. It is noticeable as an illustration of this influence that the general election at the close of this year made scarcely any inroad into the Parliamentary majority.

Fall of North. The Government, therefore, was bolstered up for another year until the surrender at Yorktown gave the *coup de grâce*. "Oh God, it is all over," cried North, with a correct appreciation, when he heard the news. He resigned on 20th March 1782. George, who felt his position so bitterly as to exclaim that he wished he were dead, fell again into the hands of the Whigs. The despised Rockingham appeared again as Prime Minister, and with him the detested Fox. But the new ministry was far from united, for it included also Lord Shelburne and his moderate Tory friends. "Half of the Ministry is for the King, half for the public," said Fox. All were indeed agreed that peace must be made on the basis of American independence, and also that economy was necessary at home. The best-remembered achievement was, therefore, the passing of Burke's bill for economical reform, which got rid of many of the worst and most useless abuses; while revenue officers were in future forbidden to vote at elections—a heavy blow to royal influence.

Lord Shelburne. Rockingham soon died and Shelburne succeeded, but was left by Fox. The latter had that open and unconcealing nature which is so often joined with violence of speech, and could not bear Shelburne. The

new Prime Minister has been more discussed than almost any secondary figure in English history. Some have seen in him the real founder of the new Toryism, and complain that he has been both misunderstood and misrepresented. But nearly all his contemporaries judged him to be insincere, sly and secret, full of that "pride which apes humility," and it must be considered a heavy count in his condemnation that Pitt, who had come into political life as his disciple, and was now serving under him, utterly refused in 1784 to consider him as a colleague.

The Coalition of Fox and North. Shelburne did not do much, for indeed he was not given the time. Early in 1783 North and Fox, those ancient enemies, agreed together and overthrew him. In spite of the desperate resistance of the King, they also took his place. Thus came into existence the most notorious Coalition in English history. It is foolish to think that there is anything wrong in coalitions in themselves, for party should always be the servant and not the master of national warfare. Nor is it wrong that individuals who have used the most violent language about each other should combine, if in exceptional circumstances the safety of the country demands it. The Coalition Government of May 1915, to ensure the more efficient prosecution of the War, is a good example. Few modern statesmen had employed more violent language than Mr Lloyd George and Mr Bonar Law, but no one blamed them for acting together in a national crisis to pass measures in which party had no share. But the case in 1783 was different; there was no great national crisis, for the terms of peace were assured, there was only a union of opposed personalities and opposed parties for the purpose of dividing the spoils and carrying on an ordinary party government, which was naturally restricted to the few subjects on which both sides could agree. Fox

had constantly spoken of North as if he were a common criminal; he had impugned his honour, accused him of falsehood, and expressed hopes that he would end on the scaffold. Nor was his fury of vituperation buried under a mass of intervening years. It had issued as a constant stream almost until their combination. Fox might well be reconciled with North as a private individual, but to choose him as a colleague showed a horrible lack of political principle. The King, who seemed fated to exchange bad ministries for worse, made every possible effort at resistance. He regarded Fox with a hatred probably inflamed by the beginnings of an unsound mind. But in the end he was compelled to submit. The events of the next few months are more like a moral tale or the unfolding of an orthodox melodrama than the course of history usually displays. First the wicked prosper, then they meet with a check. Next appears the young, blameless, and somewhat priggish hero. He is surrounded with every difficulty and danger, so that all right hearts beat quicker for him; but finally he is enabled to vanquish and overcome all his enemies.

The Fall of the Coalition. The two leaders had a comfortable majority in the House of Commons; they got on well with each other, for both were the most placable and good-natured of men, and they believed that no alternative government was possible. But as Fox rightly felt, there could be no stability while the King's hostility remained undiminished. His opportunity came with the first great measure brought in by the Coalition, a bill to regulate the charter of the East India Company, and to bring it into closer relationship with Parliament. The details do not concern us here, as the whole question will be dealt with later in a chapter on India. The bill made its way through the House of Commons, but was thrown out by the Lords

in December 1783. George had taken the precaution to give Lord Temple an autograph note in which he declared that anyone who voted for the bill would be regarded as his personal enemy. This was far the most flagrant example of royal influence with the legislature since the revolution. It was a mean action, for a King who "can do no wrong" must in honour refrain entirely from underhand intrigues against his ministers. He would have acted constitutionally had he dismissed Fox and North before the rejection of their bill, as he did immediately afterwards, but he wished to make sure beforehand of their legislative catastrophe, and hoped they would save him the trouble by resigning.

The Advent of Pitt. When Fox heard that George had sent to deprive him of the seals of office he said unbelievingly, "He would not dare." He expected, and most experienced politicians agreed with him, that the country would be thrown into confusion and Parliamentary business paralysed until the Coalition returned to office. George, however, knew what he was doing, and made Pitt his Prime Minister. This young man was not yet twenty-five, but he had already served as Shelburne's Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had acquired a reputation as an eloquent debater inferior only to Fox, Burke, and Sheridan. There has probably never been a man of his age who united such high talents, such disinterested ambition, with so great a caution and self-control. He had refused the King's appeal some months earlier, but now felt that his time had come. He was himself the Cabinet, for, as we saw, he had omitted Shelburne, and his six colleagues were gilded nonentities. He was faced with a minority in the House, with almost all the ablest debaters ranged in a furious opposition. Fox, however, played into his hands. He felt that the Coalition needed a great deal of explanation in the country and feared

a dissolution. He actually advanced the theory that it would be unconstitutional for the King to dissolve Parliament in the middle of a session. Pitt was content to wait, for his position was improving daily. When the general election came at the end of March the results surprised all the prophets. Fox lost 160 seats, and the opposition, as an effective body, was reduced to insignificance. This result, like those of 1830 and 1832, proves that with all its defects and anomalies the old system of representation could, when feelings were sufficiently aroused, break through all the bonds of corruption and influence.

The King had obtained a striking success, but it was for him a barren victory. For his young minister bound him in much stricter constitutional fetters than he had ever worn since his accession.

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CHAPTER IV

PITT AND THE NEW TORYISM

Principles of the New Party. The new minister was now seated in power. The administration, which it had been prophesied would, like the mince-pies, last only for the Christmas holidays, remained unbroken for seventeen years. Before describing its history we must inquire what was the basis of Pitt's policy, how he was able to build up a new Tory party on the wreckage of the old, which was practically to monopolise power until the great crash of 1832. Much was due to the actual personality of Pitt, who dominated his contemporaries by his eloquence, judgment, laboriousness, and unselfish patriotism. But much was due also to the coherent system of practical doctrine which he preached, and bequeathed to such venerating disciples as Castlereagh and Canning.

Attitude towards Change. Now the Tory party in England has, on the whole, steered wonderfully clear of reaction throughout its history. Its articles of faith, since it abandoned Jacobitism, have never been simply to put back the clock, like its continental counterparts. But it is always in danger of suffering from inertia, of being content with an imperfect present, and viewing all change as more hazardous than the evils which it professes to cure. Thus Toryism requires at intervals to have its essential doctrines inspiringly restated in relation to the events of the time, or it is apt to wear a negative dress. This was

the great service rendered by Pitt to his party, and indeed to his opponents also. For Whiggism had also to reconsider its tenets, and we can trace from 1784 the beginning of that long process by which the Tory becomes a Conservative and the Whig a Liberal.

It must not be supposed that Pitt himself was fond of change. Wyndham said of him—and it is a profound criticism—that he suffered from "an inveterate prudence" and could never let himself go. But he had an essentially business mind. He saw everything in relation to the work of governing the country efficiently. In so far as change was necessary to ensure efficiency he insisted upon it. But where a change, though obviously desirable, was not absolutely necessary, he saw no object in endangering his position by a persistence which was not in harmony with the feeling in the country. His attitude towards Parliamentary reform is a good illustration. He had inherited a belief in it from his father, but after the first defeat of a motion in its favour introduced by him as Prime Minister he dropped it. The House of Commons would function adequately without it, and the country gave no certain voice in its favour. Again, he seems to have felt little inclination towards what are now called humanitarian reforms. Even the abolition of the Slave Trade, which he advocated under the inspiration of his great friend, its apostle, Wilberforce, was not secured during his long period of power, but during the transient premiership of his rival Fox. It is, then, principally in the spheres of the constitution, of finance, and of political economy that he ranks as a great reformer.

Relations with the King. Pitt made clear to George from the first that he was the initiator of policy, that as the responsible head of a united Cabinet he must have the last word. Moreover, the practice of allowing or urging

the so-called "King's friends" to vote against ministerial measures which the sovereign disliked was dropped. It was the easier to induce docility into the King, as he was always haunted by the fear of a recurrence of Fox's premiership, whom he regarded with, if possible, even greater dislike, as the latter was now ostentatiously supported by his own detested son, the Prince of Wales. It is true that Pitt's premiership in 1801 was terminated by the King's refusal to sanction Roman Catholic relief in Ireland, but this must be assigned rather to a disordered mind and a narrow understanding than to any intention of acting unconstitutionally or desire to get rid of his minister.

Relations with the Cabinet. It may be truly said that Pitt restored the Cabinet system, which had practically broken down. Lord North admitted that he had used "Government by departments," which meant that, as the King was the head of the Government and director of policy, the various ministers regarded themselves as mainly responsible for their own departments, and collective responsibility as almost a dead letter. Pitt took again the title of Prime Minister which North had always repudiated. He insisted on strict discipline within his Cabinet, and in 1792 dismissed his Chancellor, that arch-intriguer, Thurlow, who had attacked a Government measure in the House of Lords, relying on the King's absolving favour.

The House of Lords. In another direction Pitt's premiership produced results more far-reaching than he probably anticipated. Up to his time the House of Lords, with the exception of the Bishops, had represented almost entirely the great territorial Whig magnates. It was a small and essentially oligarchic body. Within less than twenty years its numbers had been almost doubled, and its basis had been largely broadened. Numbers of the new rich had

been introduced who, it is true, generally bought broad acres, but were of a totally different stamp and outlook. The Duke of Portland wrote in 1794, "The characteristic feature of the present reign has been its uniform and unremitting attention and study to debase and vilify the natural aristocracy of the country. For this express purpose the present ministry was formed." Thus the way was prepared for that double development of the nineteenth century, which made the Upper House, on the one hand, the tool of the Tory party, and on the other plutocratic rather than aristocratic in composition.

Financial and Economic Policy. Many historians consider that it is in these spheres that Pitt's true greatness lies. This is hardly true, for the man himself is greater than any of his achievements, and he lives, above all, in the example which he set his countrymen during the Napoleonic wars. But there is no doubt that he was more consummately at home in these matters than in any other side of his ministerial duties. He was the first statesman who treated it as a settled policy that national debts incurred in war are meant to be paid off as far as is practicable in peace, and to point out a practical method of so doing. He set aside £1,000,000 a year for the purchase of stock, on which interest continued to be paid, which was in its turn used to buy more stock. It seems clear, even to an unmathematical mind like the author's, that the efficacy of this method depends entirely on taxation being sufficient to cover both the yearly million and the interest; but to contemporary minds the Sinking Fund, accumulating by compound interest, seemed to have a magical property of its own which would ultimately ensure repayment of the whole national debt. Probably, in point of fact, a moderate national debt is actually a national advantage, as it gives large numbers of people the most direct interest in main-

taining public credit and tranquillity. He reformed and systematised taxation, and instituted a rigid economy, which has certainly not been a general virtue of the Tory party. But it is in the sphere of economic policy that Pitt shows the greatest advance on his predecessors. Political economists and statesmen do not always match well together. The latter think the former to be pedantic, the former reproach the latter with lack of principle. But it was most fortunate that the most practical of political economists, Adam Smith, should find as his avowed disciple the statesman who best understood economic principles. The burden of Smith's famous work, *The Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, was freedom of trade. This does not mean the Free Trade of nineteenth-century politics, which ought properly to be called free imports, a doctrine about which the ablest brains seem fated perpetually to differ. It meant the freeing of trade from all the artificial restrictions which had been imposed on it by the mercantile system. It asserted that monopolies, restrictions, and excessive duties were not, as had been thought for two hundred years, beneficial, but harmful; the way to increase trade and wealth from the home country, from colonies, and from other nations was to reduce government interference to a minimum. All this Pitt fully understood and appreciated. He consolidated the customs, and by putting one moderate tax on each article he increased the revenue and simplified the collection. By reducing the duty on tea from 113 to $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. he obtained more money and dealt a very heavy blow at the enormous industry of smuggling, which was said to employ 40,000 persons. By his commercial treaty with France in 1786 he attained both the political object of fostering a better feeling between the two countries, and the economic object of facilitating the export of manufactured goods, which

the industrial revolution was turning out in vastly increasing numbers.

Pitt's First Decade. "Happy the country," runs the old proverb, "which has no history." The first ten years of Pitt's administration are a record of growing prosperity with few great events. England was engaged in no wars, nor with any great foreign or domestic crises. The trial of Warren Hastings, which belongs to the chapter on India, is the most spectacular event.

The Regency Question. There is, however, one episode which is worthy of mention, as it well illustrates both the precariousness of Pitt's hold upon power and the factious nature of the opposition. Pitt was kept in office by the King's support. In spite of his great ascendancy over the Commons, his supporters were not mainly members of his own party. One of his own secretaries in 1788 estimated the "party of the Crown" at 185 members, "who would probably support His Majesty's Government under any minister not particularly unpopular." Pitt's own party is estimated at a meagre 52 as against the 138 allowed to Fox. Without the help of that canniest of Scotch managers, Henry Dundas, whom Sir John Fortescue calls "a born wirepuller," he would have had difficulty in keeping his majority together. If, therefore, anything happened to the King, Pitt would probably go. But in 1788 George was attacked by madness, and it was necessary to provide for a Regent, who, it was agreed by all parties, could be none other than the Prince of Wales. It was certain that if he became Regent he would turn Pitt out of office, and Fox and his friends showed a repulsive glee at the prospect. Fox, however, was so rash as to declare that the Prince had the same right to succeed as Regent with unrestricted powers as to succeed to the throne on the death of his father. This was an unconstitutional doctrine, as it denied

the competence of Parliament, and Pitt exclaimed, "I will unwhig that gentleman for the rest of his life." The Government proposed a Regency with various restrictions on the Regent's use of patronage, which the Prince was obliged to accept. But the King recovered sooner than had been anticipated, and the hopes of the opposition were foiled. They had succeeded only in still further damaging their position in the country, where the placards had run "Fox for the Prince's prerogative" and "Pitt for the privileges of Parliament and the liberties of the nation."

Pitt's Optimism in Foreign Affairs. It will be noticed that Pitt's administration has been treated as a whole up to 1793, and that it is stated that no great foreign crisis intervened. This may seem a wild mis-statement when it is remembered that the French Revolution broke out in 1789. But for more than three years Pitt considered that the revolution made no change in the relations of England with Europe. A modern writer has well spoken of his "superb indifference" to the events which were succeeding one another in such a thrilling drama across the Channel. He actually stated in the House of Commons in February 1792 that "unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country when, from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace than at the present moment." We have now to see how the French Revolution gradually broke up the established order in Europe, and how England within a year of Pitt's speech was unwillingly involved in a struggle which was to last almost unbroken for more than twenty years.

CHAPTER V

ENGLAND AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: AT PEACE

State of Europe in 1789. It will be well first to consider the position of the various European powers towards each other at the outbreak of the Revolution, in order that we may understand the principles on which British foreign policy was based.

Europe, speaking generally, at the close of the eighteenth century was in a condition of anarchic selfishness. Sorel, the famous French historian, says, " L'Europe n'existait point " ; by which he means that there was no conception in the minds of statesmen of the well-being of Europe as a whole. We must not exaggerate the depravity of the then directors of policy ; we do well to remember that in our own days before the Great War the European chancelleries can provide us with abundant instances of cynical and shameless selfishness. But it remains true that the conditions of diplomacy were singularly opportune for the free internal development of the revolution and for its subsequent victory over the old state-system. The eighteenth century was pre-eminently the age of the balance of power, an ambiguous phrase which then meant roughly that if any one of the principal states of Europe gained an accession of strength, the remainder considered themselves entitled to seek compensation. This system had led to a number of wars and also to a complicated chain

of alliances. England conceived of her rôle as that of the maintainer of a balance by allying herself against any power who threatened to become too powerful, but by avoiding permanent continental alliances.

France herself had two existing alliances. First, the Family Compact with Spain, which she valued because it gave her the aid of the Spanish navy in case of war with England, and strategical control of the whole coast-line from Toulon to Dunkirk. This alliance was virtually repudiated by the French national assembly in 1790, when Spain was in danger of war with England over a colonial dispute.

Secondly, the Austrian alliance, which had started with the ill-starred Seven Years War and had been for long detested in France as worse than useless. A futile attempt to revive its vitality by a joint attack on the independence of Holland in 1787 had been another illustration of its impotence. It had called into being a successful counter-alliance of England, Prussia, and Holland, which was mainly occupied from 1789–1791 in trying to induce another alliance, that of Austria and Russia, to make peace with Turkey, out of which as usual they were carving portions. The indifference of Englishmen at that time towards their nineteenth-century protégé practically broke up the Triple Alliance, as Pitt was forced to recede from his promise to support the Prussian ultimatum to Russia.

Finally Austria, Prussia, and Russia all had their eyes suspiciously fixed on another " sick man " of Europe, the republic of Poland, whom they had mutilated in common in 1772. All three were determined that if his assassination became necessary it should follow the same precedent.

If we add that most European sovereigns were mad, or at least feeble-minded, and all the continental states except Holland bankrupt, it is easy to see why Pitt kept on year

by year anticipating peace and reducing the armed forces of the Crown. For France seemed to be getting weaker and not stronger as a consequence of the Revolution. In fact, the most dangerous symptom in Europe was thought to be the weakness of France, which might encourage her neighbours either to fall on her or, taking advantage of her impotence, to run after schemes of aggression elsewhere.

Effect of the Revolution on English Opinion. Nor was the effect of the Revolution upon English opinion at first in the least alarming. It was, indeed, welcomed with enthusiasm by almost all classes but the highest. But it was welcomed mainly in the belief that Frenchmen were copying the principles of the glorious revolution of 1688, and it was sincerely believed that their acquisition of constitutional freedom would increase the friendship between the two countries. The excesses of the French, which, after all, up to 1792 were not very formidable, were palliated as due to the inferior and excitable nature of foreigners. It was Burke who turned the current of opinion against the French by the publication of the most famous of all political pamphlets, his *Reflections on the French Revolution*, in the autumn of 1790. Naturally, as its opponents grew more numerous, more influential, and more violent, its supporters also grew more extreme. In the House of Commons the latter were reduced to a handful led by Fox, whose friendship Burke repudiated and from whom he eventually seceded with the bulk of the Whigs. But even in 1792 the danger of any subversive infection was negligible in England. Pitt would never have been tempted to declare war in order to quell sedition at home. On the contrary, it was the war itself, "that hard taskmaster," which fomented danger at home and provided means of repression which would have been impossible in peace.

Provocative Attitude of France. It is beyond question that the foreign policy of the revolutionists themselves was the cause of a war which, until almost the last moment, they did not want, into which Pitt was reluctantly driven months after its declaration would have been welcomed by the large majority of Englishmen. Pitt was not concerned with the avowed violation of European treaties as long as they did not vitally concern this country. The seizure of Avignon from the Pope, and the refusal to respect the rights of the German Princes in Alsace, which had been violated by the abolition of feudal dues though protected by the Peace of Westphalia, showed how the French were prepared to deal with the public law of Europe, but could not possibly be described as English interests. He carefully maintained neutrality when Austria and Prussia became involved in war with France in the spring and summer of 1792. With unexampled moderation he saw Belgium conquered and virtually annexed in the autumn of 1792. He refrained from treating as a *casus belli* the insolent and provocative decree of 19th November, by which the French Convention promised support to all nations struggling to be free, and its successor of 15th December which declared that France would treat as an enemy every nation which refused liberty and equality and kept its princes and privileged class. The French themselves were intoxicated with their extraordinary success; they believed that a republic was invincible. Within two months they had defeated two great military powers of Europe. They had not only conquered Belgium, but Savoy and Nice; they had overrun the whole of the German left bank of the Rhine and occupied Frankfurt. They regarded themselves as the armed and triumphant missionaries of the rights of man. They had forgotten the caution which had led them to propose the cession of

Tobago and even Mauritius for the alliance of England a few months previously.

The execution of Louis XVIII., which curiously enough caused universal horror in a country which had been the first to set up a tribunal to try its monarch on a capital charge, precipitated the inevitable event. Chauvelin, the French agent, was expelled, and France declared war in February 1793.

Participation in the war, as in its more tremendous successor of 1914, was necessary for the continued existence of this country as a great power and for the preservation of the independence of Europe. Moreover, in either case we entered to preserve treaties connected with the Low Countries. In 1793 France had opened the Scheldt to navigation, which had been forbidden in the interests of England and Holland since the treaty of Westphalia, and was threatening the independence of Holland, with whom we had renewed our old bonds of alliance in 1788.

CHAPTER VI

ENGLAND AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: AT WAR

This chapter divides itself into two parts, the character of the war and the methods by which it was waged, and the effect of the war upon the condition of England.

Character of the War. It must be admitted that at first Pitt was deceived both as to the magnitude of the war and as to its nature. He thought it would be short and easy: it was Burke who correctly prophesied that it would be long and arduous. Pitt should indeed have been right, but he and the Coalition missed chances in 1793 which in war seldom recur. Now these chances were missed because the enemies of France did not understand that this was a new type of war. Its real object was not a limited territorial success such as had characterised the traditional dynastic struggle, nor a contest for colonial possessions and trade. Nor, on the other hand, was it to fight against the idea of the French Revolution, to destroy the conceptions of the Rights of Man and the sovereignty of the people, as Burke so passionately desired. Its proper aim, which long and bitter experience gradually made plain, was to cancel the French claim to extend by compulsion her own doctrines beyond her frontiers, and to destroy the independence of Europe by the armed propaganda of her national armies. This was certainly the object which Pitt professed. He was consistent throughout in demanding "security" for

England and Europe; but it was years before he understood how the management of the war could attain these ends. It is therefore not unfair to say that he was deceived about its nature.

The resources for war are men and money: it is now necessary to see how Pitt employed these two weapons.

British Armed Forces and their Employment. The jealousy of a standing army in time of peace still continued during the eighteenth century. Consequently Pitt cannot be fairly blamed for its small size, which, exclusive of the colonial garrisons, scarcely exceeded 17,000 men. But such as it was, it was far from good. The pay was so poor as to attract only the criminal or most destitute, and the organisation was mismanaged by the various overlapping authorities who were responsible for the War Department. Its exiguous numbers were eked out by Hanoverian and Hessian mercenaries, but it was used to very poor strategical advantage. As far as we can see, Pitt's ideas of strategy were determined by two things. First, an imitation of his father's methods. In the Seven Years War amphibious expeditions of small military forces escorted by a navy with command of the sea had worked wonders. But the real cause of that war had been Anglo-French colonial rivalry. The liberties of Europe had been in no danger. It was our interest to keep France busy in Europe while we stripped her of her overseas possessions. Hence Chatham's famous phrase, "I will conquer America in Germany." Moreover, the prizes of the overseas warfare had been in those days immense; no less than the dominion over two sub-continents, North America and India. Finally, Chatham had been the most inspiring and the most imaginative of war ministers. The problems which faced his son were far different. Only by defeat in Europe could the Revolution be tamed. The prizes to be gained beyond the

seas had shrunk to a handful of unhealthy sugar-islands. Yet the methods employed were but a parody of those associated with Chatham. There was, too, a second reason, in which we trace above all the influence of Dundas. Ministers desired to produce showy successes, which would "look well in the Gazette" and satisfy public opinion. Consequently they impressed upon the Coalition what Lord Acton calls "the stamp of a sordid rapacity," so that the Allies soon resembled rather a band of international robbers than the sharers in a great common enterprise.

The Policies of Subsidies. England had a small army but plenty of money. The continental powers had plenty of men but could not pay for them. It seemed therefore natural, as indeed it had done for nearly a hundred years, that England should contribute towards the upkeep of the armies of her allies. There is nothing objectionable in this method, provided that it is possible to obtain unity of aim and unity of direction amongst those subsidised. Neither of these objects, however, was at any time even approximately secured. On the contrary, the various recipients—Prussia was perhaps the most flagrant example—used their pay to further their own particular interests. The amounts paid out were indeed exaggerated by contemporaries, for they averaged with guaranteed loans less than £2,000,000 a year up to the Peace of Amiens, but even so they must be regarded as a bad investment. Foreign governments—with the doubtful exception of Austria—looked on us, as William Grenville said, merely as "a pretty good milch cow."

The Course of the War, 1793. French historians agree that Paris would have been at the mercy of a well-concerted attack. France was ringed with enemies and convulsed with civil war. Yet practically nothing was accomplished. The English made their small army smaller by dividing it

into what the French call *petits paquets*. Part sailed to St. Domingo, where without victory it perished of yellow fever. Part besieged Dunkirk and met with defeat. Part occupied Toulon at the invitation of French royalists and was driven out, partly by lack of numbers, partly by the energy of Captain Napoleon Buonaparte, though not until it had burned or sunk a large part of the French Mediterranean fleet. The Austrians occupied the whole summer in besieging the border fortresses, which they intended to add to the Netherlands and then to exchange that burdensome possession for Bavaria. The Prussians spent most of their energy in partitioning Poland. Meanwhile the French made a gigantic national effort. They enforced a rigid conscription and turned the whole country into a vast national workshop under the ruthless despotism of the Committee of Public Safety. They had their reward, for by the end of the year their country was again nearly free from invasion, and they were preparing to take the offensive with a million men.

1794–1795. The next year was disastrous to the cause of the Allies. England added to her useless diversions by an occupation of Corsica. Austria and Prussia were more than ever pre-occupied by the death-bed revolt of Poland headed by Kosciuscko. As a result the French recaptured all their border fortresses, drove the Austrians out of Belgium after the battle of Fleurus in June, compelled the British to evacuate their last strongholds round Ostend and Antwerp, and in the winter triumphantly overran Holland. An unusual frost ruined the Dutch water defences, and Pichegru's cavalry captured part of the Dutch fleet, a unique event in history. The war had taken on the character which it was to maintain for fifteen years. England and her allies were consistently beaten on land, but the British fleet remained victorious at sea. Pitt had

always taken care of the efficiency of the navy, which produced a line of admirals as famous as Napoleon's marshals. The string of victories began this year with the first of June, when Howe utterly defeated the main French fleet.

In 1795 the Coalition, which had long displayed gaping cracks, broke utterly to pieces. Prussia and Spain deserted what was so inappropriately known as "the common cause," and made peace with the regicide republic. Nothing was achieved on land. On the contrary, two English expeditions to La Vendée, the district on the south of the Loire where the royalists had been in rebellion for two years, were defeated. In the former we suffered the great discredit of allowing a body of *émigrés* landed from our ships to be massacred after surrender. Beyond the seas we made important conquests in Martinique, the Cape, and Ceylon; but they had, of course, no shadow of influence on the issue of the war.

1796–1798. Events now took an even worse turn. Spain, by an exceedingly dishonourable reversal of policy, joined with France. The Austrian armies were overthrown, one after the other, in Italy by Napoleon's famous campaign; she was forced to make peace in 1797, and England stood absolutely alone. Pitt himself, much against the will of the King, made two attempts at peace, hoping that the Directory, a more settled government than any which France had endured since the Revolution, might prove more reasonable. His overtures were mistaken as a confession of weakness, and his envoy, Lord Malmesbury, expelled from France.

Now that Spain and Holland were engaged in the war our naval strength was strained to the uttermost. The whole coast from Toulon to the Texel had to be watched, our commerce and colonies all over the world protected. Though Jervis heavily defeated the Spaniards at Cape St.

Vincent in 1797, where Nelson first won his reputation, the position remained dangerous, and we withdrew from the Mediterranean for nearly two years. It became desperately critical when the naval mutinies—the only examples recorded in our history—broke out. They affected almost every division of the fleet, but the most dangerous took place in home waters, at Spithead and Sheerness. The pay of the seamen had remained unchanged since Charles II.'s reign, and food and even the water, supplied by dishonest contractors, were often of a repulsive character; they were refused leave and were liable to punishments of extreme barbarity. It is much to Pitt's discredit that while he had taken such pains to create efficient ships, he had so neglected the interests of the men who manned them. Except at Sheerness, where the sailors were infected by political agitators, they confined themselves entirely to service grievances, and returned cheerfully to duty as soon as those were redressed. It was probably the most dangerous moment in our modern history, and with the means of communication which exist at the present day must have proved fatal.

In 1798 the Directory was emboldened to take a double offensive against us by sea. A small force was successfully thrown into Ireland to aid the rebellion which had broken out there. It was captured not without difficulty, though its numbers were no more than 1000. Napoleon also sailed with a great armament for Egypt, with enormous plans of threatening India and of destroying the Turkish empire by attacking Constantinople from the east. By singular good fortune he evaded Nelson, captured Malta on his way, and landed safely at Alexandria. Nelson found the French fleet riding at anchor, thrust himself by a most perilous passage between them and the land, and destroyed them with utter destruction. Napoleon was stranded; his

advance against Turkey was foiled by the resistance of Acre under Sir Sidney Smith whom he honoured with the title of "the man who spoiled my destiny." Next year he deserted his impotent army and returned secretly to France to become its absolute master.

The Second Coalition, 1799–1801. Meanwhile Europe was beginning to draw itself together again to oppose the insatiable republic whose conquests had put those of Louis XIV. to insignificance. The Directory, too, was in a precarious state. France was full of rebellion and internal chaos; it seemed as if a vigorous effort might achieve success.

Austria, Russia, and Naples joined in the new league. The French were driven out of Italy and back upon the Rhine. But two causes rendered this coalition as impotent as its predecessor. In the autumn of 1799 Napoleon overthrew the tottering government of the Directory. France at last had the national government which she deserved, after the extraordinary heroism and success of her national armies. Placed in complete control of her internal and external relations, he established a despotism which depended on no faction; and, unlike the Directory, sincerely anxious at the moment for a speedy peace to consolidate his position, turned upon his enemies who refused with insult his immediate offer of negotiations. The military effort of France was now directed by one single mind with an unequalled genius for war.

The position of his opponents was far different. It is said that General Sarrail, the Commander-in-Chief of the Salonika expedition in 1916, impatient at the delays and difficulties, both political and military, involved in the control of the armies of five nations, exclaimed: "After all, Napoleon was not such a great general; he had only to deal with coalitions!" The Allies in 1799 were indeed

in a worse state; they had no commander-in-chief, no nominal direction of policy. There was not even any common treaty between the various members. Pitt had got a larger and a better army, thanks to the new methods of recruiting from the militia, and to the exertions of the Duke of York, who had become Commander-in-Chief at home. He had better generals, as notably Sir Ralph Abercromby, an inspiring example of the Christian gentleman and soldier. Yet once again he parcelled out the 80,000 available soldiers in different isolated expeditions, all far too weak to secure any strategical decision.

The Czar Paul, a violent lunatic, withdrew at the beginning of 1800, irritated with this country for taking Malta, of which he conceived himself, oddly enough, to be protector, and for a joint muddle in which both countries had participated in Holland. Austria persevered in her heavy unimaginative way until the end of the year; but, thoroughly beaten in both Italy and Germany—at Marengo and Hohenlinden—was compelled to sign the Peace of Lunéville in February 1801.

All the hopes had faded and we were left alone against Napoleon. The Czar stirred up a revival of the Armed Neutrality of the North against us. We retaliated by one of those bold strokes which a threat to our naval supremacy has so often called forth in our history—by bombarding Copenhagen and destroying the Danish fleet. It was on this occasion that Nelson put the telescope to his blind eye to avoid seeing the signal of recall hoisted by his surly and timid superior, Sir Hyde Parker (March 1801). About the same time Paul was murdered in his palace, an assassination so opportune that the French quite groundlessly accused us of being its contrivers.

Such was the menacing aspect of foreign affairs at the moment when Pitt fell from power. We must now cast

back our view and examine the condition of England during this long period of war.

The Personnel of the Government. Pitt said on one occasion, "I place much dependence on my colleagues. I place even more dependence on myself." Canning said also, "I do not know whether Pitt will save us, but I am sure that he alone *can*." These two utterances give a true measure of his position. But in spite of his predominance, he had a difficult team to drive. In the first place, as he supported coalitions abroad, so, after 1794, he had a coalition at home, when the Duke of Portland and the Old Whigs threw in their lot with him. A coalition means, it is true, a greater volume of potential Parliamentary support, but it also necessitates an immense amount of management and of mutual give and take. For it is important to remember that Parliament maintained to the full its supremacy during the Napoleonic wars, and did not practically efface itself in favour of the executive as in 1914–1918.

The three principal members of the Government after the Prime Minister were ill-assorted and difficult to combine. Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, whom Pitt, his first cousin, styled "that proud man," exhibited always that irritating high-mindedness which never relaxes, which constantly vents itself in the frigid and superior lectures of a head master without humour, and yet finds an endless justification in perpetrating jobs for the right people. Dundas, whose fertility in finding jobs for fellow Scots was even greater, was a cheerful politician without any humbug or many scruples—he was finally impeached in 1805 for permitting malversations of public money when at the head of the Admiralty. He wielded an immense influence over Pitt, which Wilberforce considered the greatest flaw in the latter's career, and, as we have seen,

always tried to direct the strategy in such a way as "to have a good press." Both his policy and his personality were exceedingly ungenial to Windham, justly considered the most promising and attractive of the younger Whigs. He is the perfect type of the chivalrous and generous young aristocrat from Eton and Christ Church who takes naturally to political life. He constantly urged the claims of the French royalists to support, which Dundas as persistently ridiculed. In order to effect a compromise between them, Pitt occasionally sent them insufficient support, which only made the trial of their civil war the harder to bear.

Ministers, however, though divided on foreign questions, had no difficulty in agreeing on a policy of repression at home.

Measures of Repression. Pitt has often been censured, as notably by Macaulay, for organising a kind of conservative reign of terror without any adequate justification. Writers who have never lived through a great war are far too apt to forget that war is not peace, and to judge war measures by peace standards; and, further, to judge the war measures of 1795 by the peace standards of their own later generation. If a man in 1795 could be sentenced to death in the ordinary course of law for stealing a few pence, it does not seem extravagant that he could be sentenced to transportation for life for sedition in war-time. The test of a good law, a philosopher once said, is whether it is useful. Now it can hardly be doubted that the suspension of Habeas Corpus and the other exceptional measures passed during the war were useful, because they gave the Government the power to crush speedily and effectually any attempt at insurrection. The French Revolution itself had shown the enormous danger of allowing a small well-organised minority to perfect its plans and then seize power by a sudden unsuspected stroke. Still, one may

admit that the laws were useful and yet deny that they were wisely used. This seems to me the fairest criticism to pass on Pitt's administration. In times of crisis the wisest plan is to arm the executive with wide powers, but not to use them except under clear necessity. Herein we can praise the good sense and forbearance of those who directed our country in the late war.

Character of the Discontent. What then was the character and extent of the discontent in Great Britain? It must be remembered that opponents of the Government are very apt to praise the institutions of the country to which the Government is hostile, without being in the least prepared to adopt them. Everyone knows that the affection professed for the Soviet system a few years ago was largely actuated by this very human motive. Just so, many, like the Duke of Norfolk, drank to the health of "our Sovereign, the Sovereign people," merely to annoy the Government. They would have been horrified if anything approximating to the French revolutionary methods had been adopted in this country.

But beyond this simulated disaffection there undoubtedly existed important organisations of a genuinely revolutionary character. The real difficulty of the Government was to disentangle the threads of discontent, and to deal with severity only with that portion which was dangerous. This does not perhaps sound a very difficult task, but in point of fact it was very delicate to draw the line between legitimate criticism and dangerous propaganda, between constitutional agitation and seditious conspiracy. Here again we must remember how powerfully the influence of the French Revolution worked upon the minds of the governing classes. The Revolution was mainly begun by moderates, by what we should now call sincere and respectable Liberals, but they were soon overthrown and their place taken by

extremists. "The revolution," said Vergniaud, one of its most famous orators, "is like Saturn, she devours all her children." Consequently the Revolution left behind it an intense fear of Liberalism which lasted in England for a generation and on the Continent for two. With all the evidence at our disposal to-day we can divide the discontented into three overlapping classes.

Desire for Parliamentary Reform. Pitt himself saw, as his father before him, that the system of Parliamentary election admitted of no logical defence. A system which gave two members to Old Sarum or Grampound, which were less than decayed hamlets, and none to Birmingham or Manchester, which gave Cornwall forty-four members and the whole of Scotland forty-five, which gave in some boroughs like Westminster practically universal suffrage, and in others restricted the franchise to a few corrupt freemen, or to the mayor and corporation, which allowed boroughs to be sold like houses or land, which gave to these boroughs, mainly corrupt, a representation fourfold that of counties which maintained a higher standard of independence, was beyond question absurd. Pitt's own motion in favour of a moderate reform had been defeated only by a small majority in 1785. It is probable that a majority of the middle class desired a reform which would increase their influence. Now, there was clearly nothing illicit in demanding what the Prime Minister himself was known to favour, even though he regarded it inappropriate while the country was at war. Nor was any person prosecuted simply for advocating Parliamentary reform. But a reform of Parliament which appeared adequate in 1785 was apt to appear as a pitiable compromise in 1793. Englishmen, as we know, prided themselves on being the freest people in the world, and looked down with pity on the "slavery" of foreigners. But now the French, with

whom we had been particularly fond of comparing ourselves, to their heavy disadvantage, were supposed to have obtained a freedom far exceeding that of any nation in modern history, while the position of Englishmen, if altered, was altered for the worse. Hence carefully balanced schemes of studied moderation such as that finally carried in 1832 fell out of fashion, and many reformers began to agitate for universal suffrage, equal electoral districts, and annual parliaments, and avowedly to base their democracy on that of France. Thus we see how easily the simple reformer tended to fuse his ideas with those of the real revolutionary.

The English Jacobins. The unrepresented classes and areas knew that they would not get any reform, therefore they played with the idea of revolution. They formed secret societies, aimed at establishing a British Convention to supersede Parliament, adopted in places a semi-military organisation, and feebly and sporadically set about manufacturing and collecting arms. They took as their bible the works of Tom Paine, the *Rights of Man* and *Common Sense*. Some of them followed his example and maintained a correspondence, as far as they could, with the enemy. They seem to have been strongest in such towns as Birmingham and Sheffield and in Scotland, where the general level of education was higher and where the electoral system was a corrupt parody of that prevailing in England. Yet, though the evidence makes it clear that this revolutionary organisation existed, it was neither widespread nor actually dangerous. There was not a single attempt at insurrection, and it is said that not a single person lost his life through violence. Hence the trials of the ringleaders prosecuted by the Government have an unnecessary air, and the sentences inflicted, as fourteen years' transportation on the young Scotsman Muir, appear disproportionately

heavy. It was also unfortunate that the Scottish trials came before a violent and partisan judge, Lord Braxfield, who is said to have hailed a juror in the street with the invitation, "Come awa,' Maister Watson, and help me hang ane of these daamed scoundrels."

In England the Government found that juries would not convict their clumsily selected and respectable prisoners. In short, the prosecutions were a sign not of strength but of weakness. But behind the political discontent another type existed, more vague and inarticulate, and therefore more difficult either to crush or cure.

Economic Discontent. Much of it was due to the growing hardships and difficulties arising from the Industrial Revolution, and will not be discussed until we deal with that movement as a whole. Much was due simply to the inevitable *malaise* caused by a long war, which showed few successes and seemed never likely to end. But curiously enough it was the earlier years of the war in which feeling was at its worst. It was in 1795 that the King's coach was mobbed at the opening of Parliament, and both he and Pitt placed in considerable personal danger; whereas in 1798 Mallet du Pan, a French royalist, coming from the Continent, wrote this striking tribute, "Here we are in the full tide of war, crushed by taxation, and exposed to the fury of the most desperate enemies, but nevertheless security, abundance, and energy reign supreme alike in cottage and palace. I have not met with a single instance of nervousness or apprehension. . . . The nation had not yet learnt to know its own strength or its resources. The government has taught it the secret, and inspired it with an unbounded confidence almost amounting to presumption." Though a foreigner who enters a country which is engaged in war doubtless sees to a large extent what he is intended to see, yet this language is far too strong to be

explained away. This remarkable improvement in national feeling was partly due to the action of the Directory in so abruptly refusing any possible accommodation. It was felt that the nation had no choice but to go through with the war and to oppose the threatened invasion. Two years later Pitt justified himself in the House of Commons by a quotation from Cicero, "Cur igitur pacem nolo ? quia infida est quia periculosa, quia omnino esse non potest."

This, however, was not the only reason. The years 1793–1795 had been of unusual scarcity owing to bad harvests. England could by then with difficulty feed herself even when the crops were plentiful. When a poor yield was coupled with the difficulty and expense of importation during war-time, the lack of wheat amounted to a famine. Wheat in 1795 cost about three times what it does to-day, and it is doubtful whether the purchasing power of the agricultural labourer was half as much. "Peace, bread ; no Pitt, no famine !" were the cries raised by the mob in 1795. By the next year the price of wheat was almost halved, and no such scarcity was again encountered till another black year, 1810.

It seems probable also that the multitudes of new indirect taxes created for the War Budgets were far more unpopular when they were first imposed than when people had got used to them.

We will not go into the details of war finance, but there is one tax with a famous history invented by Pitt which deserves a few words.

Pitt's Income Tax. We are now so much accustomed to an income tax that we regard it as the most permanent and profitable of all forms of taxation. It produces nearly half of the total yearly revenue. But even as lately as Gladstone's time it was regarded as a war tax, which should either be remitted or reduced to a nominal amount in

normal times. Pitt introduced and defended it simply as a war measure in 1798, to supplement the two sources of direct taxation in existence—the land tax and inhabited house duties. It embodied the same general principles as our present system. There was an exemption for small incomes of under £60 a year, and a graduation by which incomes of £60 to £65 paid 2d. in the pound, and incomes of over £200 a year, 2s. in the pound. There was no super-tax, which is indeed a quite modern invention, dating only from 1909. Finance was on a comparatively small scale in those days. Pitt's total estimates for revenue in 1798 amounted to no more than £25,000,000, whereas to-day we spend annually more than £800,000,000. He anticipated a yield of £10,000,000 from the income tax and received about £6,000,000 in place of the £350,000,000 now collected annually from the same source.

A further evidence both of the spirit and the wealth of the country was shown by the patriotic contribution of the same year which provided £2,500,000 in free gifts. On the whole, Pitt showed himself far more careful of money than is common with a powerful minister directing a great war. He was, however, carefully watched by the House of Commons, which showed no inclination to give ministers *carte blanche* by granting enormous votes of credit as in the late war. The wealth of the country was actually increasing far more rapidly than the expenditure, owing to the expansion of trade and commerce; consequently the Government's loans were subscribed without difficulty at a reasonable rate of interest. The strength of British finance then, as before and afterwards, astounded the world.

CHAPTER VII

THE RESIGNATION OF PITT AND THE PEACE OF AMIENS

Pitt's Resignation. The events which led up to the fall of the great minister belong primarily to the history of Ireland and will therefore be related in the chapter on that country. At this point they may be shortly summarised as follows. Ireland had been granted legislative independence in 1783, but this was largely nullified in practice by the stranglehold maintained over the executive through the government of the Lord Lieutenant at Dublin Castle. After the outbreak of the revolutionary war, Ireland drifted into civil war and finally the rebellion of 1798. Next year it was reported that a garrison of 45,000 soldiers was not sufficient to hold down the country. Pitt therefore determined upon the Union of the two countries, which was successfully carried through the Irish Parliament after bribery on a scale unprecedented even in those days. He realised, however, that the Union could not be successful without its healing counterparts of toleration and civil relief for the Roman Catholic population, who formed more than three-fourths of the whole. To this measure he stood definitely committed. But he was prevented by the inflexible resistance of George, who declared that he would commit the sin of perjury by violating his coronation oath if he gave his assent to such a bill. He repeated again his threats of 1783, that anyone who voted for it would be con-

sidered his personal enemy. There is no reason to suppose that he dishonestly seized a pretext to get rid of Pitt, whom he valued and feared, though without affection. His narrow intelligence was convinced that he was being forced into the commission of a deadly sin. Moreover, it must be remembered that his mind gave way again almost instantly after Pitt's resignation. The obvious signs of unpopularity which had greeted him on public occasions during the last few years had preyed upon him. With all his faults, he had worked desperately hard for what he believed to be the good of the country, and the supposed ingratitude of the country was exceedingly bitter to him. It is recorded that the first symptom of his insanity was noticed in church, when, in a voice of terrible emphasis, he applied to himself those words of the Venite, " Forty years long have I been grieved with this generation, and I said, It is a people that do err in their hearts, for they have not known my ways." Pitt therefore resigned on 3rd February 1801. It has sometimes been said that he knew that peace must be made, that it would be a peace of which no one could be proud, and therefore preferred to leave its making to a successor; that Catholic emancipation was a pretext, because a few months later he pledged himself not to raise it again during the King's lifetime. But this pledge came after the King's madness and after his own ascription of it to Pitt's insistence. Also, it is inconceivable that he would in that case have given Addington a pledge of support which he considered as binding until his successor released him, and which therefore prevented him from resuming office at will. It is, finally, a charge which is quite inconsistent with Pitt's character as I read it.

Addington. His successor was Addington, who was singularly unfortunate in following so great a man and in having to deal with such great events. Canning's couplet

is deservedly quoted, because it sums up the succession so exactly:

"Pitt is to Addington
As London is to Paddington."

Paddington is a respectable borough, but London is the metropolis. Addington was eminently respectable! His father was the King's doctor and had gained fame by prescribing a hop pillow for his sleeplessness. He himself had been Speaker of the House of Commons and had once at least been named by Pitt as his successor. He was subsequently a member of Lord Liverpool's Government, and as Home Secretary gained an unenviable fame in his old age for the measures of repression after Waterloo. He was a competent though not a brilliant man, like other prime ministers both before and afterwards.

The Peace of Amiens, 1802. Peace with France was accepted as a necessity. The war had become a stale-mate. England was supreme at sea, France on land; neither as it seemed at the moment could vitally injure the other. Preliminaries were signed at London in October 1801, and the definite peace at Amiens in 1802. England ceded her conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad. France evacuated Naples and the Papal States and restored Egypt to the Sultan.

The first impressions of the peace were fairly favourable, and Pitt himself generally approved. But in reality it proved no more than an agitated truce. This was mainly due to two omissions and the use made of them by Buonaparte.

Its Defects. (i) The English negotiators allowed themselves to be outwitted, for they signed a peace which exactly fulfilled the intentions of the First Consul, who wished to prevent England from meddling with affairs on the continent. Now the peace was signed on the assumption that

the Peace of Lunéville, made with Austria, would be kept. But there was no provision by which Buonaparte engaged with us to respect that treaty. We were therefore deprived of any regular method of protesting against any infraction of that treaty, to which we were not parties either directly or indirectly.

(ii) There was no arrangement for any treaty of commerce between the two nations, and a resumption of regular trade had been the principal reason why the middle classes were so anxious for the conclusion of peace.

The treaty was in reality vitiated before it was signed. Buonaparte, who knew that Austria was not in a position to protest, violated the Treaty of Lunéville wholesale. He kept his troops in Holland, he organised the Swiss and North Italian republics in such a way as to make them the merest satellites of France. France held or dominated every strategical gate leading into Central Europe.

Moreover, he showed not the smallest intention of facilitating commercial relations between England and France.

Mistakes of the Cabinet. The Addington Cabinet were naturally alarmed and angry, but their methods played into the hands of Buonaparte. He had been most careful to fulfil his obligations towards England and had evacuated the territories mentioned in the treaty. The proper method of protesting against the violation of the Treaty of Lunéville would have been to denounce the Treaty of Amiens and demand a revision, which would have supplied the omissions already mentioned. This procedure would have put Buonaparte in a considerable difficulty, as he was by no means prepared for an immediate resumption of the war. Instead of which the Cabinet, assuming the validity of the treaty, refused to carry out an important article until the French, on their part, carried out the Treaty of Lunéville. We refused, therefore, to proceed with the stipulated

evacuation of Malta in favour of the Knights of St. John. Thus we committed technically an infringement of the treaty. "Woe to those who break treaties!" exclaimed Buonaparte theatrically to Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador at Paris, with his eyes on Europe as an audience. Though Buonaparte took every opportunity of embittering the uneasy relations between the two countries, he does not seem, strangely enough, to have intended to create a rupture. He never to the end of his life understood the psychology of his principal enemy, and he apparently believed that he could bully "a nation of shopkeepers" into submission. The internal condition of France and the state of the navy both demanded a longer spell of peace. His own ambitious colonial enterprises and a naval expedition to India would have been futile if he had anticipated a renewal of the war as early as May 1803. But he could not give way; even as late as 1813 he told Metternich in a famous interview that it was of the essence of the parvenu ruler to be always successful, and that it was only the long-established sovereigns who could afford to make concessions. Doubtless also he despised the mediocre ministers whom he had duped and whom he considered incapable of taking the great decision.

War unavoidable. The renewal of the war was unavoidable, given the attitude of the two countries, who, both knowing themselves to be unbeaten, were determined not to yield. Buonaparte was now speaking openly of his destiny as "the new Charlemagne," whose empire of the West would bring all Europe under the dominance of France. He said on one occasion that he had as much right to make conquests in Europe without the leave of England, as England had in India without the leave of France.

To England it was a matter of life and death not to be

excluded from the Continent. Europe dominated by one power has always meant a threat to our insular security. If the only foreign policy of Europe were such as France dictated, France could turn the whole of her vast resources without uneasiness to the conquest of England. Our retention of Malta was not therefore the cause of the renewal of the war, though it caused the war to be renewed on 18th May 1803 rather than on some subsequent date.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RETURN AND DEATH OF PITT

Napoleon's Plans for the Invasion of England. The renewed war hung fire for two years. The two great combatants faced one another "in the posture of gladiators," but there was no considerable action either by land or sea. Napoleon, who became Emperor of the French in 1804, and is now properly styled by his Christian name, created a vast camp at Boulogne with more than 100,000 soldiers, described as the "army of England," who were to cross the Channel in flat-bottomed boats and dictate peace at London. Meanwhile he pushed forward the reorganisation of his fleet, reinforced by that of Spain in 1804, with which he hoped to gain control of the narrow seas for twenty-four hours. The English volunteers encamped over against him along the whole coast from Dorset to Kent. Hardy's *Trumpet Major* gives a vivid picture of the anxiety and alarms during those years for the dwellers on the coast. Pitt himself, as Warden of the Cinque Ports, acted as colonel of the Militia Regiment and spent much energy in directing the defences. The Martello towers then built as a line of forward resistance can still be seen dotted about the coast.

The navy earned the chiefest glory in all its history, both by the perfection of its scientific organisation and in battle at Trafalgar. There was no time until 1914 when so large a proportion of the population were enrolled in

some form of defence, though much of the organisation was very haphazard and of little military value. Sir John Moore said to Pitt when he was inquiring about the position to be taken up by his men, "Do you see that hill? You and yours shall be drawn up on it, where you will make a most formidable appearance to the enemy, while I with the soldiers will be fighting on the beach." Moore had a better right than some professional soldiers for his contemptuous tone, for he had done more than any other officer to create a new efficiency in the regular army by his reforms in drill and musketry.

Pitt's Situation. Addington's conduct of the war aroused much criticism. His only strategy appeared to consist in waiting passively for invasion without any comprehensive plans for the military forces of the country as a whole. Like many ministers he was not conscious of his own inadequacy, and was loath to resign power though ready to make unacceptable accommodations with Pitt. The latter returned to office in April 1804, but not with the Ministry that he tried to construct. He wished for a powerful coalition, which should include Fox. George was adamant, saying he would prefer civil war to Fox in his counsels. Fox behaved with great generosity and advised his friends to accept office. Grenville, who was on bad terms with his cousin, successfully prevented any accession from the Whigs. Pitt had, therefore, to create the Cabinet on a narrower basis as best he might. The Prime Minister himself was grievously stricken in health and had expressed the opinion that Grenville's refusal to co-operate would cost him his life—a foreboding which was fulfilled in less than two years.

Trafalgar and Austerlitz. 1805 is one of the great dramatic years of history. Napoleon met with his final defeat on sea—for after Trafalgar no fleet action took place

between the opposing navies—and won his most famous victory on land. It is an epitome of the whole character of the war since 1793.

Spain had thrown in her lot with France, after many hesitations, in December 1804. Napoleon had, therefore, a greater naval force at his disposal for securing command of the Channel. He made an elaborate plan which he forced on his reluctant admirals, by which the whole allied fleet, blockaded in their several harbours from Brest to Toulon, should be united in the Channel, after a dash to the West Indies had lured into pursuit and baffled the British squadrons. The plan failed, for, though Villeneuve with his fleet escaped from Toulon and drew Nelson after him across the Atlantic, the seals on most of the other harbours remained unbroken, and Villeneuve retired to Cadiz. It was now the middle of August, and England was completely free from the danger of invasion two months before Trafalgar was fought. On 21st October Nelson found the combined Franco-Spanish fleet of thirty-three sail, who had come out of Cadiz, broke their line in two places according to his predetermined plan, and captured or destroyed eighteen. It is said that the news of his death caused such sorrow in England as completely to overshadow the natural joy and relief at the triumph, and that the stage coaches from London which brought the first news to the provinces were covered with mourning instead of being decked with ribbons and flowers as was usual for victory. Nobody has ever won the hearts of the whole country from top to bottom as Nelson did. He was worshipped not so much as a great man of war as for himself. He had a wonderful faculty of loving and understanding which enabled him to get the best out of everyone—it was typical of his influence that his captains were known as the "band of brothers." He had far fewer reserves than most

Englishmen ; he was not afraid of showing and sharing emotion, and had a love of chivalrous display which the French call *panache*. No wonder that Pitt is said to have found his manner very excitable and to have contrasted it unfavourably with that of Wellington.

Meanwhile Pitt had arrayed together a third coalition. Austria, whose stubborn resistance to the French Revolution was only temporarily relaxed by defeat, declared war for the third time and was joined by Russia. They were financed by Pitt at the rate of £12, 10s. per annum for every soldier put into the field. Contrary to expectation, Prussia, miscalculating for once the issue of her invariable doctrine of narrow self-interest, remained neutral, and allowed Napoleon to transfer his army of England by a brilliantly executed scheme of converging routes through South Germany to the Danube. On 20th October, the day before Trafalgar, the Austrian General Mack capitulated at Ulm with 30,000 men. The French marched down the Danube, occupied Vienna, and utterly defeated the combined Austro-Russian army at Austerlitz, a little village in the modern Czecho-Slovakia, on 2nd December. The " sun of Austerlitz " became the legendary symbol of the glories of the Empire ; its name is now enshrined in the prosaic temple of a Parisian railway station, like our crowning mercy of Waterloo. Austria collapsed and the Russians retired eastward.

The Death of Pitt. It was said that Austerlitz killed Pitt. A month before he had been hailed as " the saviour of Europe " at the Guildhall, and had replied in the last and most perfect of his public speeches, " Europe is not to be saved by any single man. England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example." He died in January 1806, literally worn out. It is amazing to remember that this man, who had been

the principal minister of the Crown for twenty years, was actually younger when he died at forty-six than any but three of the subsequent prime ministers on their first accession to that office.

That he was not a great war-minister is generally agreed. His ideas of strategy and, in particular, his methods of execution were very weak. He seemed incapable of learning by experience, for in the last year of his life he divided the English military forces in the old futile way; always optimistic and, until the news of Austerlitz, never cast down. Yet in a moment of penetrating insight he prophesied that the war would end with national risings against Napoleon, which would have their origin in Spain. His plans for the reorganisation of Europe were cherished by his great disciple Castlereagh as a sacred trust, and the dead Pitt inspired British policy at the Congress of Vienna. He remains the most striking embodiment in our history of a resolute, undaunted, and utterly disinterested patriotism. In February 1783, in his final speech before the fall of Shelburne's Government, he said, "You may take from me the privileges and emoluments of place, but you cannot and shall not take from me those habitual and warm regards for the prosperity of Great Britain which constitute the honour, the happiness, the pride of my life, and which, I trust, death alone can extinguish." When he lay dying his last recorded words were, "My country, how I leave my country." His true epitaph is written in the words wherein the Epistle to the Hebrews commemorates those men of faith who died without seeing the accomplishment of their work, "These all, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise: God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect."

CHAPTER IX

BLOCKADE AND COUNTER-BLOCKADE

The Ministry of all the Talents. George now accepted Fox as Foreign Secretary under the premiership of Grenville with surprising docility. The Ministry had a great name and a fine appearance of Whig ability, but neither lasted long nor accomplished much. It is chiefly remembered in history for the abolition of the Slave Trade, which Fox carried through in the last months of his life. Although he was almost constantly in opposition during the thirty-five years of his political career, he has to his credit not merely this great humanitarian reform but also the Libel Act of 1791. This measure helped to secure the freedom of the press by giving the jury the legal right to determine whether a publication was a libel, which the judges had hitherto held to be within their sole discretion.

He had also made an offer of peace to Napoleon, trusting somewhat naïvely to the favourable impression he had formed of his character at an interview during the Peace of Amiens, but was soon convinced that Napoleon was making war implacably on England and not against any particular minister. It will not be necessary to follow in detail the ministries which succeeded one another during the next few years until Lord Liverpool entered upon his enormous premiership in 1812. It has been said without much exaggeration that the Tories and Whigs had now exchanged the respective positions which they held during

the reigns of the first two Georges. The Tories were now so strong and the Whigs so weak that a two-party system had toppled over, and the ministries were made up by agreement between the leading Tory factions, who were only a little less selfish and rancorous than their Whig predecessors. Even the most fervent disciples of Pitt did not always wear their master's mantle: Canning, the most brilliant, was grasping, egoistic, ungenerous, and unscrupulous in his dealings both with colleagues and subordinates. Perceval and Castlereagh were the two worthiest inheritors of Pitt's tradition, and they improved enormously on his military policy. But the time of their real importance is not just yet.

The Franco-Russian Alliance. Before we consider the measures by which Napoleon hoped to overthrow the British Empire, which was no longer directly assailable by French sea-power, it will be convenient to carry on the account of the continental war until the dramatic reversal of alliances at Tilsit in June 1807. Austria was forced to make a humiliating peace in 1806. Napoleon ruthlessly pursued his policy of thrusting her eastward, which Bismarck was finally to accomplish in 1866. She was deprived of all communication with the west by the extension of Bavaria through Tyrol; she was driven out of Italy and deprived of the Adriatic by the cession of Istria and Dalmatia, which became French provinces. The confederation of the Rhine made a great hostile ring round her north-west frontiers.

This same year was most deservedly a bad one for Prussia. In return for her cringing neutrality she received Hanover from Napoleon, only to find herself blockaded on the North Sea by the British Navy for accepting a stolen province, which Napoleon was at the moment negotiating with Fox to restore to England. A wild declaration of

war was instantly followed by a total defeat at Jena by the hands of the French. The effete system of Frederick the Great collapsed, and the country was overrun by the enemy, who occupied Berlin.

The Russians fought on manfully and inflicted a fearful check on the French in the snow and bitter frost at Eylau in February 1807. It was far the bloodiest battle that the Emperor had yet fought. But in June he heavily defeated them at Friedland and drove them back into Lithuania. The young Czar Alexander was by now heartily tired of the war. He had an impulsive and ill-balanced, though in some ways a very generous, nature. Metternich, who read him like a book, said that the key to his character was the realisation that he changed completely every five years. At the moment he was bitterly aggrieved with his chief ally and paymaster, England, not, it must be admitted, without weighty reason. He had constantly asked for our help in the Baltic and had been put off with repeated excuses and delays. An inadequate force was just disembarking on the Island of Rügen in Pomerania when he was meeting Napoleon at Tilsit. Nor was our financial aid calculated to compensate for this military inaction, for Grenville, who disapproved of subsidies, refused with a grudging air to pay more than £500,000. "If you hate the English as much as I do, all is easily arranged" was reported as Alexander's greeting when he met Napoleon on the raft at Tilsit. Napoleon carefully flattered "the excellent young Emperor," as he called him, and cajoled him into the belief that between them they could settle the fate of the world—"What is Europe if it is not you and I?" Accordingly Prussia was left to her fate, and the treaty was signed which Napoleon hoped would enable him to complete his plans for the speedy economic ruin of England.

The Continental System. Napoleon intended to dominate the whole Continent and to crush England. It was impossible for him to invade or defeat her at sea. Consequently some other method must be found of bringing her to submission. He determined, therefore, to strike with the economic weapon which was not forged by him but invented by the revolutionaries and developed by the Directory. He proposed to use it on an unprecedented scale, which he believed his mastery over Europe made possible. Napoleon was an old-fashioned economist, whose ideas had developed little from those held by the Mercantilists in the seventeenth century. His argument was as follows. A favourable balance of trade is necessary for the welfare of any commercial country, which means that there must be an excess in the value of exports over imports. If, therefore, it was possible to stop exports, the manufacturers would be ruined, gold would be drained out of the country, credit would be destroyed, and collapse inevitable. So he attempted to shut English goods out of the Continent altogether. Now, in the first place, this was a mistaken policy. The only weapon which could have dealt England a mortal blow even in those days was the cutting off of imports, and in particular imported food. The use of this weapon by Germany in 1917 put us into the most grievous peril of the War. It is true that the population was then only a third of its present figure, but the land no longer grew enough wheat for consumption even in a year of good harvests. As it was, in 1812 wheat reached 125s. a quarter and stayed near that enormous figure for eighteen months. We should have been in all probability forced to make peace had not foreign supplies reached us, which Napoleon did not discourage as the great price was drawing so much gold abroad. The riots and troubles of that year, which proved formidable enough,

would have been intensified by actual starvation if we had been deprived of one and a quarter million bushels of imported grain.

Secondly, the policy was an impossible one for the continent to carry out. No country was or could be economically independent of England, which had a monopoly of colonial produce, tea, coffee, and spices, and supplied the world with clothing, boots, and machinery. Napoleon was compelled to issue licences which permitted trade with England for favoured persons in specified articles; it is said that his army which marched on Russia was mainly shod with English boots and clad in English greatcoats.

Further, Napoleon was not able to enforce the system even with his own permitted modifications. It meant logically—and Napoleon accepted the logic—the possession or control by France of all the sea-coast of Europe. The attempt led him to overestimate his own prestige and the power of the French Empire; it led him into the fatal Spanish enterprise—"that ulcer" which, in his own words, "destroyed him"; it hastened everywhere the spirit of national resistance.

Finally, even where he controlled the coast-line he could not control the islands. From Heligoland we poured immense quantities of smuggled goods into Northern Germany; all his armies of soldiers and revenue-men could not prevent our goods sailing up the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems. Sicily and the Ionian Islands were similarly depots to serve the Mediterranean lands.

It cannot, indeed, be denied that the continental system struck heavy blows at our trade. Goods had to be diverted by devious and expensive routes, there were violent fluctuations of value, constant periods of over-production, and a general rise in prices. It interfered with our

strategy by the search for new markets and led to the most crazy failures of all our eccentric expeditions, those sent to South America to conquer Buenos Ayres and Chile. It led to our retaliation by the Orders in Council, which declared that all ports which excluded British goods were in a state of blockade, and forbade neutrals to trade with such ports; the rights claimed by neutrals were more rigorously disregarded than at any previous period; and the last and most formidable result of our enforcement of maritime law, as we interpreted it, was the outbreak of war with the United States in 1812.

The Results of Tilsit. Napoleon had not, of course, the least intention of allowing Alexander to gain any considerable advantage; on the contrary, he desired his alliance as his most powerful tool against England. By the secret articles he arranged to close the Baltic entirely against us, to secure the use of the considerable Danish and Swedish navies, to extinguish Portugal and gain a new French base at the Tagus. Such a scheme, if carried through, must impair if not destroy our naval ascendancy, or at the very least make the continental system far more effectual by adding so greatly to our commitments.

The secret clauses reached the British Government almost immediately, by what channel is one of the most fascinating mysteries of modern history. Canning, who was Foreign Secretary, acted with a rapidity, boldness, and disregard of international law, which will always be praised or blamed in accordance with the views held by men as to the nature of the State and its relations to others. If the saying "Necessity knows no law" is a good defence, then Canning is well defended. A great expedition arrived at once before Copenhagen. The Danes refused our offer to take their ships as a deposit until a general peace. As always, they fought with great bravery, but we bombarded

their capital and took away their ships. The key of the Baltic had been snatched from French hands.

The failure of Napoleon to carry out the secret articles of Tilsit marks the turning-point in his career. The hope of a speedy end to the war was gone. He had to turn to his plan of conquering Europe, which was bound, as he himself saw, to lead him into conflict with Russia.

The Invasion of Spain. Napoleon coveted the Iberian Peninsula and the great colonial possessions which went with it. He had seized Portugal by a sneaking piratical expedition in 1807, and next year considered Spain also ready to fall into his net. He had a dynastic hatred for any branch of the house of Bourbon, whom he was determined to extirpate from Europe as a ruling family. The Spanish royal family was indeed exceedingly low and contemptible, but there are few actions in history more degraded than the steps taken by Napoleon to kidnap father and son and bully them into abdicating the crown. He made his brother Joseph King, and expected that there would be no trouble from the despised Spaniards, whose country was speedily occupied by large bodies of French troops. But the Spaniards began their national resistance in May, which never ceased until the downfall of Napoleon. The French had immense difficulties with which to contend. Spain was a great barren country with few roads, cut off from France by the Pyrenees, which had practicable passes only at either end; the whole configuration of the land was against the invader, with the successive lines of rivers and mountains running athwart the French advance. The low state of political organisation possessed by the Spaniards was to their advantage in a guerilla war; local organisation was the only type which they knew, and the capture of Madrid was a blow to their pride but not to their efficiency. England could give the insurgents invalu-

able aid in two directions; she could prevent movement of French troops and supplies by sea, and keep an army in the Peninsula to be a perpetual thorn in Napoleon's flesh. Canning grasped at the opportunity; for here at last was an opportunity of allying with a people who were fighting tooth and nail for independence, in place of the old coalitions with their cross-currents of dynastic and territorial ambitions.

British troops compelled Junot to evacuate Portugal by the Convention of Cintra in August 1808, but Sir John Moore, who succeeded to the command, could not prevent the fall of Madrid or effect a junction with the Spaniards. The French now numbered 250,000 men under the personal command of Napoleon. Moore was at Salamanca, north-west of Madrid, but did not retreat on his old base Lisbon. On the contrary, with great audacity he moved north-east to threaten the French line of communications with France *via* Bayonne. As he expected, this gave Portugal and the South a respite, for Napoleon directed overwhelming forces against him. He retreated over the mountains with great speed in the middle of winter, in January 1809, turned upon the French at his port of embarkation, Corunna, in the extreme north-west corner of Spain, repulsed them in sight of his transports, and fell mortally wounded. Though he lost more than half his force, his is justly considered as one of the celebrated retreats of history, for few have achieved more important strategical results.

Wellington and his Army. In April 1809 Sir Arthur Wellesley, who afterwards became Duke of Wellington, was given command of our forces in the Peninsula, which he kept until the Peace of Paris in 1814. He was a young man as generals go, only thirty-nine years of age, who had won a great reputation in India for his conduct of the

Mahratta War. Since his return he had been a soldier-politician in the House of Commons, holding office as Chief Secretary for Ireland until he actually left for the Peninsula. Thus he had a better knowledge of ministers and appreciation of their difficulties than most of his fellows, and this knowledge was so used by him as to be of great value in the next few years. He was a grim, self-contained man, of whom Sir John Fortescue says, "He never, that I can discover, had a friend." He austerely demanded by his own example complete devotion and efficiency in the service, but felt little or no gratitude. There is something inhumanly detached in his assertion made years afterwards that his soldiers "were the scum of the earth who enlisted only for drink"; though, on the other hand, we must remember how completely he broke down after the victory at Waterloo, saying that there was nothing worse than a battle won except a battle lost. He had the great advantage over modern commanders of being constantly before his men in the day of battle, unmoved and erect on his charger, turning the eyes of all men to himself in hope and confidence.

He knew better than anyone else the limits of the possible, though he set those limits wide. He knew beforehand exactly what he meant to do and how he meant to do it. Pitt praised him because he raised all his difficulties before accepting a responsibility and none afterwards. He is a living example of the truth of that saying, "He that believeth shall not make haste." He had patience because he knew for what he was waiting.

He inherited a far better army than his predecessors in organisation, discipline, drill, and musketry, and he made it what indeed it ought to be, given its small size—the most formidable instrument of war in Europe. The British line almost always defeated the French column. The column is

the natural formation for an army which relies on the offensive with great numbers imperfectly trained; it was the inevitable outcome of the national army of the French Revolution. The massed weight of the column is exceedingly dangerous if it can close with the enemy intact. Wellington's normal tactics were: first, to disorganise its approach by his light troops, who reached a high pitch of excellence as skirmishers under Crawford; secondly, to draw up his line in concealed ground, behind the crest of a hill or sunken fence, so that the enemy was uncertain of his objective and of the strength of his opponents to the last minute. Finally, he reserved the fire of the British line until the French were close upon it, when it was directed in concentrated and deadly volleys at distances of between 70 and 30 yards. If we add that he had all the caution and daring of the great soldier, so that the French marshals never felt sure whether he was going to attack or defend, to advance or retreat, it is clear that he was a most dangerous antagonist.

His Plans in the Peninsula. Wellington's scheme, which he had matured before starting, had, as has been well said, the simplicity of genius. It was based on two assumptions: first, that the Spanish national resistance would continue indefinitely; secondly, that he would be so supported by the home government as to have a constant supply of not less than 30,000 British troops. "I have always been of opinion," he wrote, "that Portugal might be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain; and that in the meantime the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French." It would, he estimated, take 100,000 French troops to drive us out of Portugal, a number which they could never spare while Spain continued in revolt.

He therefore created the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras, north of Lisbon, into which his troops could retire if hard pressed, protected on either flank by the sea and the mouth of the Tagus. From there he made, year after year, great sorties into Spain, threatening Madrid and the whole western line of French communications *via* Burgos and Valladolid. This had the desired effect of drawing against him all the best French troops, which diversion again enabled the Spaniards to reorganise resistance in those districts in which it had been overwhelmed. Hence it came about that though the French maintained in Spain up to 1812 the enormous number of 350,000 men, they were never able to approach the completion of their task. Further, it became clear that Napoleon would not be allowed to spend the whole of his energy in the Peninsula as in 1808. Next year the indefatigable Austrians again declared war. Napoleon had to divert more than 200,000 men to the Danube, where he succeeded, it is true, in beating down his enemy, but only after a severe struggle, during which he suffered his first real defeat at Aspern.

In 1810 the exigencies of the continental system forced him to annex Holland, the North German coast, and a large part of Western Italy ; all these extensions added to his commitments. By the next year it was becoming certain that he would be involved in the breach with Russia which will be related in the next chapter.

Course of the Peninsular War. It is no part of this history to give details of campaigns. We will not therefore follow Wellington further in the Peninsula than to say that until 1812 his advances were in the nature of deliberate sorties to be followed by retreats in the autumn. In 1812 he fell upon the two fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, which guarded the southern and northern exits from Portugal, and had remained a constant threat to his

communications. These he stormed early in the year with terrible loss, which led the troops to sack the towns and commit excesses rare in the history of our army. Advancing victoriously he entered Madrid, but contrary to intention was compelled to fall back as usual on Portugal, after his failure to capture Burgos on the great road to France.

Next year he left Portugal for good, drove Joseph by a great turning movement into the Pyrenees, after defeating him so heavily at Vittoria that he had to abandon all his artillery and baggage. Throughout that winter bitter fighting took place for the control of the passes ; but in the spring of 1814 his advance was stayed only by the suspension of hostilities at the beginning of April, when he had already entered the great cities of the south-west, Bordeaux and Toulouse, amidst a welcoming white-cockaded population.

This great series of campaigns is said to have cost us no more than 40,000 dead, or about the same number who perished fruitlessly of yellow fever in San Domingo.

CHAPTER X

THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON

Home Affairs, 1809–1814. The main interest of these years centres in the climax of the continental war, but it is necessary to give a short account of the men who directed our policy through to its triumphant conclusion. In 1809 the Duke of York was forced to retire owing to the unsavoury discovery that his discarded mistress, Mrs Clarke, had been in the habit of selling military appointments. The real value of his term of office as Commander-in-Chief has only been fully appreciated by recent historians. Later in the same year Castlereagh and Canning both resigned and fought a duel, the motive of which was an underhand intrigue by which Canning had tried to get rid of his rival from the War Office.

Perceval succeeded the Duke of Portland as Prime Minister and held office till 1812, when, alone of all our Prime Ministers, he was assassinated by a lunatic. He, too, had been one of Pitt's favourities, who reckoned him the equal of Fox in debate. Honourable and upright in all his dealings, he gained a great ascendancy over Parliament, and had a far higher notion of political principle than the old Duke of Portland. He supported Wellington loyally, and told him exactly what he could expect in those disappointing years when a decision in the Peninsula seemed so remote, and when the opposition were howling for the return of the army. He was succeeded by Lord Liverpool,

who held the premiership for fifteen years. He had seen much of the world in a variety of diplomatic and political posts, and must have been a very competent, tactful, and knowledgeable man. But as Premier he still remains a dim personality, who was far better at managing men than dominating them. He is unfairly, though naturally, judged rather by the last fourteen than by the first three years of his premiership. He is overshadowed by the two great figures of his foreign secretaries, Castlereagh and Canning. If we read his correspondence with the former in 1814–1815, we must certainly conclude that his own views on foreign affairs were poor and short-sighted, and that Parliamentary tactics loomed far too wide in his horizon. Castlereagh indeed paid little or no attention to him.

The Walcheren Expedition, 1809. It has already been mentioned that Austria again made war upon Napoleon in 1809. His hands seemed indeed full with the two vast armies he had now to handle in the east and west of Europe, and the Government decided upon the last and most unfortunate of their overseas expeditions. Like the Dardanelles adventure of 1915 it was a "side show," with enormous strategic possibilities, which was ruined in its execution. Napoleon himself described his possession of Antwerp as "a pistol pointed at the heart of England," and Castlereagh wrote in 1813 that to allow the French to keep it would be to burden our country "with a perpetual war-establishment." The object of the expedition was, therefore, to seize this great naval station and to control the Scheldt. If successful it would serve as a base for attacks on either Belgium or Holland. The latter country in particular was groaning over the miseries of the continental system and was considered ripe for revolt. The expedition was ruined by the incapacity and slowness of the commander, who was nicknamed "the late Lord

Chatham." It failed to take Antwerp by a *coup de main*, and achieved no more than the capture of Flushing and the occupation of the pestilential island of Walcheren at the mouth of the Scheldt. When it was withdrawn in December it had lost nearly half of its 40,000 men and had achieved absolutely nothing. The disappointment was great at home, for expectation had been aroused. The course of the war for the next two years did nothing to allay it, while distress at home reached its climax and found vent in the dangerous Luddite riots, which will be described in the economic chapter.

The Moscow Campaign. Between 1809–1812 Napoleon stood at the apparent summit of his power. He had allied himself by marriage with a still more weakened Austria. He had added the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to the confederation of the Rhine and extended his empire to the Vistula. But during these years the Russian alliance cracked. It was intensely unpopular with all classes of Russian society, who found it absolutely impossible to exist without English goods and regarded Napoleon as Antichrist. Alexander himself was speedily repenting, for he feared Napoleon as a neighbour, detested his encouragement of Polish nationalism, and realised that the Emperor thwarted rather than helped his designs against Turkey. Therefore, at the end of 1810 he opened his ports to English goods, and war was recognised as inevitable. Napoleon said in his fatalistic way that "his star was leading him" to attack Russia, and, in spite of his marshals' opposition, spent 1811 in preparing for a decisive campaign on a gigantic scale. In 1812 Napoleon crossed the Niemen with 600,000 men, half French, half a motley collection of unwilling conscripts scoured from every corner of his empire. The two Russian armies, at first declining battle, joined their forces, lost the battle of

Borodino, where the combined losses approached 100,000 men, and left Moscow to Napoleon, who entered it with little more than 100,000 troops. It was burned by the Russians, and Napoleon was forced to retreat in October. The French were compelled to follow the same devastated route of the summer, for the Russians successfully barred the alternative road. Their ruin was completed by frost and snow. The greatest army of modern times had been "destroyed with utter destruction," as Thucydides wrote of the Syracusan expedition.

The Revolt of Europe, 1813. This year marks the revenge of Europe for the French Revolution. The wheel had indeed come full circle. The Revolution had started with the great outburst of French nationalism, which was to bring freedom and happiness to all other nations, "war to the palace, peace to the cottage." It had made war in the name of nationality and humanity against dynastic despotism. Now the French themselves were trying to keep the galling yoke of a centralised imperialistic despotism upon the peoples of Europe. Hence 1813 is the conservative revolt of nationalism, and the war is waged to reassert the independence of the nations of Europe. "The peoples are now the only barrier," wrote Castlereagh, "and they are against France." Thus the Coalition of 1813, though it still displayed many of the weaknesses of its predecessors, had behind it a really popular driving-force, which up till now had been so sadly lacking. For the impulse which drove Central Europe to rise against Napoleon came not from above but below. The whole of Germany was seething with the Tugendbund or League of Virtue, a secret society which was everywhere attacking the French couriers and hampering their communications. The defection of Prussia came not from the King, but from the general, Yorck, who found that it was impossible to get

his soldiers to fight with the French. By 10th August, when the mountain fires in Bohemia proclaimed that Austria, after long procrastination, had joined against Napoleon, he had to face almost the whole of Europe. Even his two marshals who had gained the kingdoms of Sweden and Naples, Bernadotte and Murat, joined arms against him. "Where the carcase is there will the eagles be gathered together." It needed only the failure of his defence on the Elbe to break up the Confederation of the Rhine. At Leipsig in October, at "the battle of the Nations" as it was appropriately called, Napoleon, outnumbered by two to one, was so broken that for three months he could not give battle. He retreated beyond the Rhine, and so the year ended.

Defects of the Grand Alliance. Yet the position of the Alliance was not all that could be desired. Great Britain suffered from having no army in the principal theatre of war, for the only troops which she engaged at Leipsig was one rocket battery, and from having no single plenipotentiary who could speak with authority in the camp of the allied sovereigns. Nor was there any one treaty which bound together the whole confederacy. Russia, Austria, and Prussia were naturally far more intent on reorganising Central Europe to their advantage than on stressing the points on which we laid most importance, such as the independence of the Low Countries and Spain. They still regarded us as "a good milch cow" and kept pressing our Government to state what maritime conquests it would surrender for the purpose of bargaining with Napoleon. But he played throughout into their hands. He rejected their proposals like the Sybilline books, for each time they set their demands higher. Even after Leipsig he refused at Frankfurt an offer of the "natural frontiers," the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees, which to the extreme vexation of the

British Cabinet would have left Antwerp in French hands.

Castlereagh and the Treaty of Chaumont. The war approached its decision, for by the beginning of 1814 the Allies were encamped on French soil. Both politically and militarily they were at cross-purposes and full of conflicting plans. The British Government saw that they must provide a representative who could speak with undivided authority, and sent Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, to the allied headquarters. It is appropriate here to say a few words about this great man, who was so reviled and shamefully entreated by his own generation, but has received in modern times a triumphant vindication. If you look at his portrait, you see a face of extraordinary personal beauty and dignity. He had indeed much of the haughtiness and disdain of popular favour, so characteristic of the old Roman patricians. Popularity and unpopularity, he once said, were both alike, except that the latter was the more gentlemanlike. He seems to have accepted the doctrine that the end justifies the means in politics, for he had been the prime agent in carrying through the Irish Union by bribery, and showed a very tortuous policy in dealing with Murat, and, in 1816, when abandoning the Sicilian Constitution to its fate. He had inherited from Pitt a very high conception of the duty of Great Britain towards Europe, and of the component parts of Europe to one another. He was essentially what is now called "a good European." Though by no means a ready and not always an intelligible speaker, he gained an influence and even an ascendancy over continental princes and statesmen only equalled by Marlborough and Mr Lloyd George.

He went abroad with two closely connected aims. First, to bind together all the combatants into one single treaty, which would give security that "the common cause"

should be pursued to the end without faltering. It was the more needful, as the Allies had entered into negotiations with Napoleon, and went so far as to ask for an armistice on 21st February after Napoleon, with inferior numbers, had won some marvellous local victories. On 9th March he succeeded in getting the Great Powers to sign the Treaty of Chaumont. By this famous instrument they bound themselves to continue the war for twenty years, if necessary, until they had reduced France to her ancient limits. Each Power undertook to furnish 150,000 men, and Castlereagh, with a just pride at "this unexampled display of power," agreed in addition to furnish subsidies of £5,000,000 per annum. It was the death-blow to Napoleon, for the Allies, leaving him behind, marched straight on Paris, which capitulated at the end of March.

The First Peace of Paris, May 1814. His second aim was to secure a just and durable peace which should give security to Europe as a whole, and should so treat France that she would have no inducement to disturb that equilibrium by a desire for revenge. In his own words, "It is not our business to collect trophies but to bring the world back to peaceable habits." The settlement of Europe must be reserved till the next chapter; we will now consider the peace with France. Talleyrand himself, who had so skilfully persuaded the Allies to restore the Bourbons and to give them a good start, acknowledged that no country had ever been so generously treated as France in 1814; and the credit for this perhaps belongs more to Alexander and Metternich than to Castlereagh. It was comparatively easy for us, having kept the most valuable of our colonial conquests, to restore the remainder, while our interest in the land-boundaries of France, except on the side of Belgium, was obviously not so direct as that of the great continental Powers.

Napoleon was banished to Elba, an island off the coast of Northern Italy, of which he was made full sovereign, and the Bourbons were restored. France herself kept the frontiers of 1792, with some small additions on the north and east. The Allies refrained from either indemnity or military occupation, and believed that under the old line of kings she would prove a good neighbour.

The American War. The continent was more fortunate than Great Britain in having secured peace, as we continued at war with the United States until the close of this year. Our economic warfare with Napoleon had naturally exasperated neutrals, of whom the Americans were probably the hardest hit, and also most capable of protesting and retaliating effectively. They had replied to our restrictions by a vote of non-intercourse with Great Britain and France in 1807, which was confined to us alone after 1810. On the whole it did the Americans the greater amount of harm. We had added unnecessarily to the friction between the countries by searching American ships for deserters from our navy. Madison, the American president, seems to have cherished schemes of conquering and annexing Canada, and was not averse from the trial of war. It broke out in 1812, after we had modified the Orders in Council to meet American needs, but too late to prevent its declaration. It was fought in an envenomed spirit, for the old soreness had not yet healed. Still, it was surprising that New England was so decidedly against it that the secession of these states to Canada was seriously considered as a possibility. The course of the war was somewhat paradoxical. The Americans had expected to overrun Canada, which was inadequately defended, but they were thrice defeated and driven back. In the course of the invasion they burned Toronto, for which we retaliated when able to take the offensive by burning the public

buildings of Washington. On sea the war resolved itself into a number of single combats, where the American frigates, which had heavier guns and better gunners, proved generally victorious. The celebrated duel between the *Chesapeake* and *Shannon* acquired its notoriety not so much on its merits as because it broke the humiliating run of American successes. The war dragged on throughout 1814 until it was concluded by the Treaty of Ghent in December. Since that date there has been peace, though not always amity, between the two countries.

CHAPTER XI

THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM

(I) Abroad

The Congress of Vienna. The Peace of Paris had arranged a settlement only with France; it still remained to recast Europe. A congress assembled in Vienna in September for that purpose, representatives of every country which had been engaged in the war being entitled to attend. Such a gathering of sovereigns, potentates, and statesmen was the occasion of the most magnificent display. "Le Congrès danse mais ne marche pas" ran the famous epigram, alluding to the way in which the endless festivities impeded business. It was also the scene of the most elaborate intrigue and espionage. One of the Austrian secret police complained that he could not bribe Lady Castlereagh's elderly maid to hand him the contents of the waste-paper basket every morning. The conduct of business, as at Paris in 1919, was kept entirely in the hands of the Great Powers, who claimed to speak with authority for the rest of Europe.

The Balance of Power. The work of the Congress was supposed to be directed towards obtaining two great results, as to which all the Powers professed agreement in principle. The first of these was the balance of power, which is a vague term but one to which Castlereagh at least attached a very definite meaning. It assumed the existence of Great Powers who must be responsible for the

general direction of European policy. It was intended to secure that no one of these Powers would be strong enough in territory, population, and influence to dominate Europe, or even to feel tempted to do so. Castlereagh regarded this as so vital that he was ready to go to war during the Congress with Austria and France as allies to prevent Russia from taking the whole of Poland, and Prussia the whole of Saxony. On this occasion he deliberately disobeyed the one definite instruction which Liverpool sent him. Even as it was, British statesmen considered that Russia had been left too strong; and most of our foreign policy in the nineteenth century was directed by a fear and hostility towards "that great cloud of power in the North," as Chatham had picturesquely called it.

Security against France. It was not considered sufficient to have reduced France to her ancient limits; it was necessary also to strengthen the areas round her borders, whose weakness had made it possible for them to be so easily overrun. Here Pitt's schemes, so strongly adopted by Castlereagh, won, generally speaking, acceptance. Belgium was handed over to the Dutch, who were provided with several million pounds from the French indemnity in 1815 to build barrier fortresses. There was nothing unnatural in this union, which had, of course, existed under Spain until the end of the sixteenth century. The Belgians had never been independent, and more than half of them were Flemish, speaking a language almost identical with Dutch. Had they been given a large measure of home rule instead of being treated as merely part of an enlarged Holland the union would probably not have been broken in 1830. Prussia was given the old ecclesiastical lands west of the Rhine, and thus put forward as the champion of Germany against France, the first stage towards a united Germany under her leadership. Austria, with com-

plete British approval, took most of Northern Italy and dominated the remainder of the Peninsula, many of whose rulers were of Habsburg blood or connections. Finally, Switzerland was declared neutral and put under a general guarantee of the powers.

The Conservative Character of the Settlement. The Congress of Vienna has often been absurdly condemned for adopting conservative principles. What other principles could it have adopted? With the exception of Great Britain, all the other Powers were autocratically governed by sovereigns by the grace of God. They had been avowedly fighting against the principles of the French Revolution, against the ideas that peoples were entitled to choose their rulers and their political destiny by revolt and universal suffrage. It would have been impossible for them to recognise the principle of nationality without destroying the sanction of their own authority. How could they have failed to restore the petty princes of Italy and Germany who had held their titles by exactly the same right as the great sovereigns, but had not been strong enough to maintain their independence? It is a wilful mistake to suppose that the populations were panting for nationality based on self-government. On the contrary, they wanted to be left alone under their old rulers, who were everywhere welcomed back with enthusiasm. Do not, therefore, believe the legend that Castlereagh and Metternich were deliberately putting back the clock and consciously condemning great populations in Europe to misery.

Defects of the Settlement. Yet it would be affectation to assert that the settlement was an ideal one, or even that it was free from criminal defects. First, it is noticeable that the policy of restoring governments overthrown by the French Revolution was hypocritically not extended to

republics. Genoa and Venice, which had behind them hundreds of years of independence, were finally extinguished. Nor did the eastern monarchies do anything to expiate their own most resounding crime, the partition of Poland. There was a fairly strong desire in England for its restoration, which Castlereagh pretended to favour in the House of Commons but entirely neglected at Vienna. Moreover, though the restoration of such monarchs as the kings of Spain and Naples was inevitable, it did not follow that they should be left free to misgovern their people as they thought fit. Their restoration was due entirely to the Great Powers, who were fully entitled to exact guarantees against a misgovernment which was certain by its effects to cause general trouble in Europe. Such guarantees were well known in contemporary international law, examples are actually to be found in the Treaty of Vienna itself. It is not to Castlereagh's credit that he failed to take the smallest interest in this subject, though it was urged by the opposition in the House of Commons. He did not foresee the difficulties to arise during his lifetime in the relations between Great Britain and the other Great Powers, which had their origin in the revolutions provoked by persistent and flagrant misgovernment.

Yet in spite of these imperfections no serious war broke out in Europe for forty years, a longer interval of comparative peace than had been enjoyed for many centuries.

The Hundred Days. The return of Napoleon in March 1815 was a hopeless miscalculation; he was too impatient and came too soon. It is an interesting speculation what would have happened if he had delayed the adventure for two or three years, until the Bourbons had had the opportunity of committing worse follies, and when Europe was largely disillusioned with the results of the conservative triumph. His propaganda of Imperial liberalism would

have had a much greater appeal. As it was, the news of his landing closed up at once the ranks of his enemies. Alexander, who had gone so far as to challenge Metternich to a duel a few months previously, now greeted him with the words, "After all we are Christians, let us forget and forgive." It stimulated energy as well as forgiveness. The Powers issued a declaration which stigmatised Napoleon as "the disturber of the peace of the world" and delivered him over to "public retribution." The provisions of the Treaty of Chaumont entered into operation, and Napoleon's only chance was to strike a resounding blow at his gathering adversaries before they could unite to overwhelm him.

The British army, as so often before, was disembarked at Antwerp to defend Belgium, while the Prussians concentrated on the Meuse. Napoleon aimed at striking the two armies separately before they had concentrated, driving each back on its base away from the other, the British on Antwerp, the Prussians on Liége, and thus occupying Belgium.

He succeeded in the first move by defeating the Prussians at Ligny, but failed to make them lose touch with Wellington. The Duke determined to defend Brussels, and fought at Waterloo in the defensive position he had previously chosen some ten miles south of the capital. It was a bold decision, for he had fewer troops than Napoleon, 67,000 against 74,000; of these only 24,000 were British, with a large proportion of recruits, for many of the Peninsula veterans were still in America.

The Belgian contingent was justly suspected as unreliable. Moreover, it was an essential part of his plan that the Prussians should fall on the right flank of the French in the early afternoon. He was therefore staking everything on the energy and good faith of a defeated commander, Blücher. The battle hung undecided from before noon

until seven in the evening, when the last effort of the French failed with the charge of the Old Guard, and the Prussians pierced the French flank. A furious pursuit through the night broke the French army into disorganised fragments. Paris would have none of Napoleon, who abdicated and fled to the western coast. The capital was occupied by the Allies without resistance, and the war was over.

Naturally the anger against the French was great, and it seemed as if renewed leniency would be ill-placed. The Prussians, who had suffered under Napoleon for seven years far more severely than any other country, wished to dismember France of all her northern and eastern provinces. Lord Liverpool and the Cabinet were also in favour of a severe lesson, enforced by considerable cessions. Castlereagh opposed his colleagues and obtained the immense authority of Wellington's support to turn the scale. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that there had been no national resistance to the Allies after Napoleon's veterans had been beaten, and that the measure proposed by Liverpool would exasperate without really weakening France. If the Bourbons were again to be restored their position at the best would be shaky enough; if a vindictive peace was imposed, there would be no hope of peace in Europe. The Czar Alexander took the same view, and the second Peace of Paris, though naturally less favourable than its predecessor, was far from severe. The small additions to the frontier sanctioned in 1814 were withdrawn, an indemnity of £35,000,000 was imposed, and a military occupation of the north-eastern provinces arranged for a maximum period of five years. The occupation was organised by Wellington with great tact and consideration, and all troops were withdrawn at his advice in 1818. No one has ever merged the conquering general into the

statesman more nobly than Wellington during these years.

The decision to send Napoleon to St Helena, for which all the Great Allies were equally responsible, seems to me perfectly reasonable and just. We incurred the odium which almost always attaches to gaolers, but foolishly aggravated it by sending Sir Hudson Lowe as governor. He was not only a tactless man but personally detested by Napoleon, as we must well have known, as he had organised a body of Corsicans to fight against the French.

180°
150°
120°
90°
60°
30°
60°
30°
Hudson Bay
Company
Canada
NORTH
AMERICA
BRITISH
ISLES
Newfoundland
Gibraltar
Bermudas
Bahamas
Turks Is.
Jamaica
West
Indies
British Honduras
Br. Guiana
Gambia
Sierra
Leone
SOUTH
AMERICA
Asce
St. H
Virgin Is.
Anegada
Sombrero
Anguilla
St. Kitts
Barbuda
Antigua
Nevis
Montserrat
Dominica
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Barbados
Grenadines
Grenada
Tobago
Trinidad
Part of the WEST INDIES
90°
60°
West 30° Long.

The BRITISH EMPIRE, 1815

British Possessions shaded, or the names underlined.

Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

CHAPTER XII

THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM

(II) At Home

The General Situation, 1815–1822. The years which follow Waterloo are a sad anti-climax and have been described as "the most miserable epoch in English history." That they should have been disappointing was no doubt inevitable—we all know the similar period of disillusionment through which we have been recently passing in the trough of an even greater war. But what principally distinguishes the earlier of the two similar periods is that no attempt was made to grapple with the urgent problems which the peace brought forth except by a policy of blank negation. Yet this failure was not perhaps as surprising as it might seem to be. In the first place there had as yet been no precedent for the effects of peace on a great commercial country, which in 1815 was more near possessing a monopoly of many kinds of trade than ever before or since. Moreover, this war had affected the whole of Europe, and had modified its whole life in an unexampled way. It was, too, a war which had been fought for the last ten years with the economic weapon. Hence all trade had been twisted and diverted from its ordinary paths to an unique degree. It would require an immense effort and much time to discover the kind and nature of trade, and the markets which British industry must seek in peace.

Secondly, the men who had been responsible for the

whole burden and heat of the war retained their positions at the head of affairs for years after the re-establishment of peace. Now history records but few examples of statesmen who are successful in organising peace after serving a long apprenticeship as war ministers. It is true that neither Liverpool nor Castlereagh was an old man—in fact, they were both about forty-five years of age in 1815—but they had spent the whole of their official life under war conditions, which had started when they had barely attained to manhood. They had exhausted most of their energy and initiative in dealing with an apparently endless succession of great war crises, and what was left after 1815 was still directed principally towards European rather than domestic problems. They had not inherited from Pitt the belief in reform which had characterised his earlier days, but seemed to have exalted into a doctrine the reverence for the *status quo*, which Burke had brought into fashion at the time of the Revolution. Consequently, as they had made up their minds to allow no serious change at home, their only method of dealing with discontent was by repression. But methods which had been defended as expedients twenty years before in the crisis of war could scarcely hope to find the same justification as the normal weapons of peace. Again, it was becoming increasingly clear in 1815 that most of the political discontent was not merely bound up with but had its origin in the great economic hardships which the course of the industrial revolution was making permanent and intensifying. Yet no measures of any kind were taken to alleviate the lot of the poor before this period ends, unless we choose to consider as such the vote of £1,000,000 in 1818 for building new churches, which it was hoped would give the poor greater opportunities of enjoying the soothing solace of religion. Naturally an attitude such as this made men

more and more distrustful of the unreformed Parliament. Feeling that it did not represent them, they gained the further belief that it represented only their enemies, from whence it is only one step further to rebellion. Consequently the blank attitude of the Government encouraged extremists to try their hand at organising insurrection, which led at once to retaliatory measures like the suspension of Habeas Corpus and the Six Acts of 1820. As always, when rebellious acts themselves are insignificant, it has been much disputed whether there was, in fact, any serious danger. We must remember that the Ministry did not merely consist of inveterate Tories like Lord Eldon, the Chancellor, who has given his name to the whole epoch, or Lord Sidmouth (formerly Addington) who was Home Secretary. It contained men like Canning and Peel, who were more liberal-minded than most Whigs. They gave their assent to all these measures, and Lord Grenville, now counted as one of the most influential Whigs, heartily approved of them. Finally, Lord Grey in 1831 suppressed a more obscure outbreak of farm-labourers in an insignificant Dorset village called Tolpuddle with greater severity.

Position of Parties in Parliament. The Tory creed at the moment, such as we have been outlining, does not sound very alluring, yet they had no difficulty in keeping a majority in the House of Commons. This was partly due to the fact that so many of the great Whig borough owners had become Tories in the last twenty years, and had taken care that the representation of their seats changed in the same way. It is stated that the Whigs, after 1815, could not normally control more than 170 seats. But the reasons for their impotence go deeper than this. Unlike most oppositions, they had thriven better on the war than they did afterwards in peace. They had been kept together by criticisms of the conduct of the Peninsular campaign,

or later on of the settlement of Vienna, but now had no positive policy nor union among themselves. The Whigs had definitely to become Liberals before they could succeed, just as the Tories had to become Conservatives after 1832. But at present they had dropped Parliamentary reform and confined their policy to criticising the Government. Even here they could not escape divisions. Lord Grey, who was afterwards to pass the great Reform Bill, retired for some years from political life in 1819, as he could not oppose the Government's repressive acts. Brougham, who was the greatest political genius, not merely in the opposition but in the country, was so deservedly distrusted that no programme drafted by him had any chance of adoption.

No better summary of Whig failures can be found than this extract from a letter written by an intelligent Whig in 1816: "As to the *general* proceedings of the opposition, I can say little. There is no superior *mind* among us; great power of speaking, faculty of perplexing, irritation and complaints, but no super-eminent power to strike out a line of policy and to command the *confidence* of the country." No wonder that the wits wrote:

> "Nought's permanent among the human race
> Except the Whigs not getting into place."

Financial Policy. The first urgent problem after peace had been secured was to take stock of the financial position of the country. Though wealth had continued to increase in a marvellous way, the burdens laid upon the country were very heavy. The expenditure of the country in 1815 had risen to more than four times the figure of 1798, when Pitt first introduced the income tax. The yield on that tax had increased two and a half times to £15,000,000. Nor was there any hope that any great reduction in expenditure was possible. The national debt had risen to

the enormous figure of £860,000,000, on which the annual interest amounted to £32,000,000. It might have been expected that even if it was impossible to reduce this debt, ministers would have refrained from adding to it in the first year of peace. But they actually borrowed £11,000,000 to fill up the deficit caused by the abolition of the income tax. The House of Commons fixed upon the undeniable fact that the tax had been created solely as a war tax, and declined the ministerial proposal of reducing it by half. It was a striking example of the independence of the Commons, who were in those days far more ready to throw the Ministry over than now. But it was a mean action on the part of an assembly of landowners, who were in this same year taking steps artificially to bolster up their own incomes. For in 1815 the Corn Law was passed, which prohibited import until the price of corn exceeded 80s. a quarter. Thus it was attempted to keep the price of corn at a war price, without doing anything to increase the purchasing power of the labourer. It is from 1815 that the hatred of the Corn Laws begins, for their predecessors had aimed rather at keeping the price stable than at winding it up permanently to such a high pitch.

Unrest and Repression. The disturbances and riots of which we hear so much between 1815 and 1820 were essentially economic rather than political in character. Most of the rioters were doubtless in favour of changing the constitution, which subjected them hopelessly to such hardships, but their actions were those rather of starving men than of agitators. Take, for example, this extract from a contemporary Radical's record, which refers to the year 1816: "In London and Westminster riots ensued, and were continued for several days, while the Corn Bill was discussed; at Bridport there were riots on account of the high price of bread; at Bideford there were similar dis-

turbances to prevent the exportation of grain; at Bury by the unemployed to destroy machinery; at Ely, not suppressed without bloodshed; at Newcastle-on-Tyne by colliers and others; at Glasgow, where blood was shed on account of the soup-kitchens; at Preston, by unemployed weavers; at Nottingham, by Luddites, who destroyed thirty frames; at Merthyr Tydvil on a reduction of wages; at Birmingham, by the unemployed; at Walsall, by the distressed; and December 7, 1816, at Dundee, where owing to the high price of meal upwards of 100 shops were plundered." Such, then, was the material out of which men like Cobbett, Place, "the Radical tailor," and "Orator" Hunt hoped to make political disciples. Cobbett in particular, with his little newsletter called *Twopenny Trash* because it managed to evade the stamp duty on newspapers, gained an immense influence throughout the country. Though his language, like that of the other agitators, was often exceedingly violent, their intentions were to supersede riots by organising immense political associations and meetings which it would be impossible for the Government to ignore. The most famous of these was the great gathering at St Peter's fields in Manchester in 1819. It was supposed that at least 60,000 persons of both sexes and all ages were present, parading with banners inscribed with such mottoes as "Vote by ballot," "Equal representation or death." None of them was armed and they showed no sign of being violent. The magistrates, perhaps not unnaturally, lost their heads at seeing such a vast gathering moving in a semi-military formation, and ordered the arrest of Orator Hunt, who was addressing it. The yeomanry then charged the crowd, of whom eight were killed and about a hundred seriously injured, many by sabre cuts. This affair was called "the massacre of Peterloo," a derisive parody of the name Waterloo. To call it a massacre is

unjustified, for there was no intention on the part of the magistrates to kill or maim any of the crowd. The fatal error was to allow the half-trained and politically hostile yeomanry to take action. Nothing requires more steady or patient discipline than intervention by soldiers on behalf of the civil power. The Territorial army is now under a pledge not to be used under any circumstances in industrial disputes. At Peterloo it was agreed that the regular soldiers present acted with moderation and self-restraint.

One of the results of this unhappy incident was that the magistrates in the near future were very loath to call upon the military. At Bristol, for example, in the Reform Bill riots, a large part of the city was burned down owing to this unwillingness. The history of the nineteenth century, however, shows that the presence of disciplined troops at the earlier stages of a riot is often the surest method of preventing bloodshed.

The Government had already suspended the Habeas Corpus Act for one year in 1817, which means that persons charged with certain specified crimes such as sedition or conspiracy can be imprisoned without being brought to trial. This is the last occasion in England, though by no means in Ireland, on which this exceptional measure of precaution was taken. The Government was therefore already in a nervous state and seems generally to have believed that Peterloo was the first act of a rebellion, whereas discontent was largely dying down owing to a revival in trade, which reached the climax in 1826. Accordingly Castlereagh introduced the famous Six Acts into Parliament in December 1819. Their severity has been a good deal exaggerated by Whig historians. Two indeed remain in force to this day against unlawful drilling and blasphemous and seditious libels. The right to search for arms in private houses was not unreasonable, especially as

its duration was confined to two years. Still, there remain two which may be fairly regarded as oppressive. For five years no meeting of more than fifty persons might be summoned for discussing religious, political, or industrial questions, except on a demand from seven householders; while only residents of the particular parish were allowed to attend. Finally, all small pamphlets were subjected to a stamp duty of fourpence, which was destined to kill their circulation by putting them out of the reach of the poor.

With the Cato Street Conspiracy of the next year we can close our account of the subject. This was a genuine assassination plot with a seventeenth-century flavour of Guy Fawkes or the Rye House Conspiracy. It aimed at murdering all the members of the Cabinet when they were dining together at Lord Harrowby's. It was betrayed by an informer, the gang was arrested and six of them executed. It was the last occasion on which the axe was used for the punishment of traitors.

Accession of George IV. In 1820 the aged King died; he had been a hopeless lunatic, totally blind and deaf, since 1810, and his power had been since that date in the hands of the most repulsive member of all the unpleasant Hanoverian dynasty, the Prince Regent, who now became George IV. He had been for many years separated from his wife, Caroline of Brunswick, whom he refused to acknowledge. On his accession the Queen, who had been the protégée of the Whigs since 1812, when George, contrary to their hopes, had refused to dismiss the Tory Ministry, came to England from the Continent to demand her rights. As she refused any of the compromises suggested by the Ministry, the latter were misguided enough to bring in what was called a Bill of Pains and Penalties to deprive her of her title.

It is surprising that monarchy in England survived this horrible scandal of a King, who had lived in notorious

immorality since his youth, pressing forward charges of adultery against his wife, which he sought to support by the shifty evidence of disreputable Italians. The man in the street naturally took the Queen's part, with the reflection that even if her own conduct had been low and indiscreet, her husband's had been infinitely worse. The majorities in favour of the bill got so small that the Ministers dropped it. Soon afterwards Queen Caroline died.

After this recital it is perhaps unnecessary to emphasise the debt owed by both the Crown and the country to Victoria; but its greatness can hardly be exaggerated.

CHAPTER XIII

CASTLEREAGH AND THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The Quadruple Alliance. It seems strange that a Ministry so narrow-minded and short-sighted at home should have been the principal supporter abroad of a system which aimed at a new organisation of Europe in the cause of permanent peace, that one so oppressive and reactionary at home should be accused by the absolutist powers not merely of leniency towards but actual encouragement of revolutionaries abroad. Yet it was so.

Castlereagh believed intensely that the Great Powers must not let fall those responsibilities which they had shouldered during the years 1813–1815; that what he called "the great machine of European safety" could only run smoothly if they all guided it in common. It was not enough to keep a permanent alliance against France, though this was an indispensable part of his plan. He had hoped for a plan by which they would formally guarantee the whole Vienna settlement, but this had fallen through. It would indeed have been a mistake to try and impress upon it any such stamp of impossible finality. As it was, he succeeded in November 1815 in getting the signatures of the Four Powers to the Quadruple Alliance, which both maintained the clauses of the Treaty of Chaumont against France, as a potential disturber of European peace, and also created a general alliance, with arrangements for

periodical meetings at which any questions likely to disturb the peace could be discussed by the sovereigns themselves or their plenipotentiaries. It will be seen that this alliance was in several respects a new departure. It recognised the responsibilities of the Great Powers for maintaining peace, for it was certain that if they co-operated, any war that broke out would be localised and soon stopped. It arranged for meetings to make the working of this alliance effective, and finally it instituted a system, which was revived after our own Great War, of what is called "Diplomacy by Conference." To handle great and urgent affairs through ambassadors might mean a great waste of time. Communications were still slow and difficult; there were no railways or telegraphs; hence governments were in the dilemma of either giving more responsibility to their agents than they were often prepared to do, or of waiting until they had sent instructions, while the problems themselves might be changing. Finally, as at home so abroad, those who had been responsible for concluding the war were responsible for organising the peace. All the sovereigns and ministers who had met so often, and had got to understand one another so intimately in 1813–1815, were still on the throne or in office.

The Holy Alliance. Castlereagh's plan had from the first a rival, which issued from the brain of Alexander. He, too, was a "good European" and desired a close co-operation of Europe in the cause of peace. But he approached the problem from the religious rather than the political standpoint. He regarded the war as essentially one against the irreligious doctrines of the French Revolution. So he produced a scheme which was both more comprehensive and narrower than the Quadruple Alliance. This he called the Holy Alliance. It was more comprehensive because it was intended to include all the Christian nations in Europe; it

was narrower because it provided no means of making itself effective. It consisted merely in a declaration by sovereigns that they were brothers, and would all rule their peoples in accordance with the precepts of the New Testament. Both Metternich and Castlereagh thought it both objectionable and odd, but saw that it committed them to nothing. It was, therefore, generally signed and shelved —we were not technically a party to it, as the Prince Regent for constitutional reasons merely expressed his high approval of its principles. In spite of what historians have loosely written, it never took the place of the Quadruple Alliance, nor was the latter in any sense merged in it.

France admitted to the Concert of Europe. The first great European problem to be settled was the position of France, how and when she was to be received back into the European family. For three years she had no real foreign policy, and even her internal policy was practically settled by Wellington, who commanded the army of occupation, and Pozzo-di-Borgo, a Corsican, who was the Czar's ambassador at Paris. This provisional arrangement came to an end in 1818, when the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the first of the periodic meetings, allowed her to become, as a great Power released on probation, a member of the Quadruple Alliance, except so far, of course, as it was directed against herself.

Break-up of the Concert. During the next two years the Spaniards began to kick against the pricks of their repulsive and cruel sovereign, Ferdinand, and to force a constitution on him through a revolution. Thus the problem arose urgently as to the relation of the Great Powers towards any European revolution. The Congress of Troppau was called to deal with it. The three Eastern Powers were now in full swing of militant reaction, for Metternich had just crushed the Liberal movement in Germany. They en-



deavoured to make the obligations of the Quadruple Alliance more precise by affirming that the Great Powers were under the duty of suppressing any revolution in Europe, whose effects might threaten the security of any other Power. This Castlereagh denied, with the support of France. His view of the Alliance was that its value would be gone if it attempted to tie the hands of the Powers to any particular course of action. They ought to be left entirely free to consider what measures, if any, were appropriate on each particular occasion. Secondly, even if that were not so, it would be quite impossible to get Parliament to agree to a policy of intervention on principle against revolutionaries. It would interfere with the cherished idea of national independence. "Logically," he said, "it means Cossacks in Hyde Park," and would, of course, be inconsistent with the principles of 1688.

The great machine of European safety received further damage in 1821 at Laybach, where the three Eastern Powers insisted on giving Austria a "mandate" to put down the revolutions in Naples and Piedmont. Castlereagh had no objection whatever to the Austrians intervening in Italy—that was the principal reason why he had supported their supremacy in the Peninsula—but he was determined that they should do so as judges of their own interest and not as the policemen of Europe.

Castlereagh and Canning. The European Concert had by now virtually shrunk into a union of three Eastern Powers for the purpose of crushing Liberalism, and is at this stage often incorrectly called the Holy Alliance. Castlereagh therefore despaired of maintaining the Concert; he had always maintained with truth that it had moved away from us and not we from it; that it was quite impossible for any British government to restrict in any way the absolute freedom of the country to inter-

vene or not in any continental question as it judged right and proper in its own interests. It is not therefore correct to say that Canning, who succeeded as Foreign Secretary in August 1822, gave a new direction to British policy; vain as he was, he scarcely made such a claim himself. It is improbable that the suicide of Castlereagh just before the Congress of Verona was the cause of the resounding breach with the rest of Europe which the French intervention in Spain to quell the revolution there produced. In fact, the instructions which Wellington, our plenipotentiary, took to that Congress were those which Castlereagh had drawn up before his death. It is true that if Canning had been earlier at the Foreign Office the breach also would have come earlier. For though there was no fundamental difference between the two in policy, there was a great difference in emphasis. Castlereagh laid the greatest stress on working with the Great Powers as far as possible, and was prepared to make sacrifices to preserve his system. Canning laid the greatest stress on British independence of action—"Every nation for itself and God for us all"—and while he was prepared to act with other Powers, as he did with great patience in the Eastern question, he made it quite clear that this should be the exceptional rather than the normal method of our Foreign Office.

Reasons for Failure. The failure of the Concert of Europe is interesting for several reasons. It shows the immense difficulties in the way of co-operation between Great Britain and Europe. We are in Europe and yet not part of the continent of Europe. It is this situation which has mainly been responsible for the accusations of hypocrisy and treachery so often made by continental politicians and historians. Further, it shows the difficulty of arranging a common foreign policy between absolute monarchs and the representative of a constitutional state. Though Castle-

reagh wrote once of "that most hazardous principle liberty," he knew well what the House of Commons would or would not stand. He also knew that it was useless to try and conceal from it any important point of policy which would lead to the commitment of Great Britain. He constantly reminded his despotic colleagues that the only free and unfettered discussion in Europe of what they were doing would be in the House of Commons.

Finally, it should be noticed that though the Concert of Europe as a formal alliance languished and died, its traditions remained throughout the nineteenth century. More than one war was prevented or localised by the action of the Great Powers. It was only when the Great Powers banded themselves into more or less permanent alliances against each other, and attracted or compelled their smaller neighbours into their orbits as satellites, that what a modern writer has called "the international anarchy" again fully established itself in the years between 1878 and 1914.

Castlereagh and the United States. Before we conclude this estimate of Castlereagh as a diplomatist we must glance at one other great service which he rendered to the cause of peace. He took every possible step to improve our relations with the United States. The Treaty of Ghent in 1814 had left many questions unsettled. Castlereagh saw that the best way to get a settlement was first to secure mutual confidence. This was done by the remarkable achievement of 1817, when with the hearty aid of Rush, one of the greatest of the many great American ambassadors to St James's, he persuaded the two Governments to get rid of their navies on the Great Lakes. Thus the frontiers between the United States and Canada were deliberately demilitarised, and have remained so ever since, an unique example to the world. It has been well said by Mr Trevelyan that if the frontiers had been fortified, war must

have ensued during some of the periods of high tension within the last hundred years. After this Castlereagh took a first step in the delimitation of the frontier in the west of the continent by settling the southern boundary of Canada as far as the crest of the Rockies, while the territory further west up to the Pacific was jointly occupied until a final settlement was made by Peel in 1846.

CHAPTER XIV

ECONOMIC LIFE

The Complexity of the Subject. It would be useless and indeed misleading to try and give any detailed picture of the changes in the economic life of the country within a few pages. It was emphasised in the introduction how vast and complicated these changes were, and how largely they prepared the way for the characteristics of the modern England in which we live. It must not, of course, be supposed that 1760 is more than a convenient mile-post on the road of change; no sensible person believes that any change in the life of a country starts suddenly in any given year; but it is nevertheless true that between 1760 and 1822 the "change" which took place was of unexampled importance in English history, and though its origins lie outside our period, we have to deal with a growth which becomes progressively more rapid and more complicated.

We have all heard a great deal of the industrial revolution, but it is not always realised so distinctly that there were other great overlapping movements of scarcely less national importance. The whole agrarian system and the means of inland communication were also in a state of flux. It will be convenient before we deal with industry to glance at the main outlines of these two other important problems.

The Agrarian Revolution. Nowadays we are so accustomed to the system of large ownership in the country that

we do not think it curious that there are so few little farms, and that most of the larger farmers do not own, but rent, their land. Yet this is a system quite unlike that prevailing in most of Europe, and one which has been very greatly intensified in England in the last two hundred years. Towards the end of the seventeenth century it is computed that there were at least 160,000 yeomen—that is to say, small farmers who owned their own land. If we allow for their families, we find that more than one-tenth of the whole population had their own roots in the soil. This naturally made for a greater independence in the countryside. It was the yeomen who were the backbone of Cromwell's armies and the deciding voice in the county elections, where all but the most insignificant of them had votes. All through the eighteenth century these conditions were changing in a somewhat mysterious way, until by the close we find that the small landowner has almost disappeared. The reasons for this very important change seem generally to be as follows: The demand for land grew steadily greater. Members of Parliament were required by law to own landed estates of considerable value; an increasing number of rich merchants wished to end their days and to settle their descendants as country gentlemen, and were everywhere buying up estates. Hence they would often offer the small man more than his land was worth, or they would take advantage of his embarrassments to buy him out. For, as farming improved and became more scientific, it became increasingly difficult for the small man without any capital except the land itself to compete with the new systems of agriculture with plenty of money behind them. Then it naturally followed that, as the yeomen became fewer, they became more isolated in their district, less independent, and more ready to yield to the pressure of the great owners.

Meanwhile another movement was gaining in rapidity,

which tended to increase the power of the great and to prove how true it is that " to him that hath, more shall be given, but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have." In 1760 it was still true that at least half of the cultivated land in England was farmed on the mediæval system of big, open fields where the villagers had strips which were cultivated on the old, unprogressive, and wasteful system of traditional rotation of crops. In most parts of England the hedges of to-day were a rarity instead of being the commonest feature of the countryside. Moreover, the enclosure of common land and waste had not been carried much further since the sixteenth century—the first of the great enclosing epochs. Between 1760 and 1820 the enclosures, each of which had to be done by a private Act of Parliament, went on with increasing rapidity, until at least 7,000,000 acres had been dealt with. This was obviously in the interests of the big landowners, who drew up and carried through the Acts of Parliament required, who got all their holdings concentrated together, and absorbed a great deal of what had been common land. It was certainly also to the advantage of agriculture; the arable land could now be farmed scientifically and experiments made in new rotations of crops which were impossible before; the pasture improved enormously and made it possible to breed sheep and cattle of much greater size and strength, which could now be maintained during the winter on the new root crops.

The enclosure of the waste, however, was very detrimental to the labourer, who had been able to cut turf for his fire and to feed his pigs and chickens upon it. And at the moment when he was deprived of this little aid towards independence the industrial revolution cut off another by robbing his wife and daughters of their earnings by spinning

and weaving, which were destroyed by the competition of the new machinery. It might be supposed that, as the growth of population and the constant succession of wars put up the price of corn, the wages of the labourer would also advance at least in proportion. But this was not the case; the agricultural labourer was then as he is to-day, less able than any other wage-earner to look after his collective interests. All combinations of workmen were strictly forbidden until just after the period with which this book deals comes to an end. The power of the labourer to move from parish to parish was restricted by the Act of Settlement of 1662, which provided that newcomers might be sent back to the parish from whence they came if there was any danger of them becoming a burden upon the new parish. Landowners sometimes pulled down empty cottages to prevent the advent of immigrants. Further, wages were now left to individual agreement, for the act of Queen Elizabeth which provided for their regulation by the justices in accordance with the price of bread had fallen into disuse and was alien to the spirit of the time, which grew more and more hostile to any forms of state regulation.

Accordingly the condition of the labourer grew worse and worse, and was made more miserable by the well-meaning attempt of the justices to remedy it. In 1795, at a meeting of justices at Speenhamland, near Newbury, it was decided to give sufficient outdoor poor relief to the labourers to allow them and their children what was considered an adequate amount of bread weekly. This measure was so generally adopted as to be called "the Speenhamland Act of Parliament." The results were disastrous in several ways. In the first place, it abandoned the workhouse test for the able-bodied poor which Elizabeth had set up, and made no distinction between the industrious and the idle.

Secondly, it relieved the farmers of their duty of paying a living wage and threw the task of supplementing it on the rates ; so that all ratepayers helped to pay for the farmers at a time when the latter were making enormous profits. It forced the independent labourer to become a pauper. Finally, it increased the amount paid in poor relief to a crushing figure, which amounted after 1815 to more than £6,000,000 a year. Ruinous and chaotic as this system was, it was not remedied until the Reformed Parliament, whose Poor Law of 1834 was long overdue.

The Revolution in Communications. One is apt to suppose that before the advent of railways the means of communication were always much the same. It would be more true to say that by 1820 communications in Western Europe had been restored to much the same level on which they had been placed when the Roman Empire had been at the height of its efficiency. It is also true that communications in England improved much more slowly than those in France, where a despotic government and military necessity had added spurs which were lacking in England.

In the first place, we had been very slow to realise the possibilities of inland water traffic and of large bridging operations. While in France canals had been widely dug under Louis XIV., they remained unknown in England for almost another hundred years. It is curious to think that the first canal in England owed its origin to an unhappy love affair. The Duke of Bridgewater, having quarrelled with his fiancée, the Duchess of Gordon, turned in 1758, with the aid of the famous engineer Brindley, an entirely self-made man from Derbyshire, to construct a canal from Runcorn to Manchester in order to reduce the prohibitive freights on his coal. As the industrial revolution increased so enormously the demand for minerals and for manufactured articles, and also widened the area of markets, the

demand for new means of communication grew not less rapidly. The construction of canals to link up all the navigable rivers, with which England has been so liberally endowed by nature, went on apace. By the end of the century it was calculated that England alone possessed at least 2600 miles of navigable canals, which triumphed over the physical difficulties by means of immense aqueducts and tunnels.

Roads, of course, unlike canals, were already in existence, but their appearance and efficiency were transformed. Such main roads as existed mainly followed the lines of their old Roman predecessors, but their metalling had entirely decayed; and no more scientific method had been discovered of repairing them than throwing down loads of big flints in the worst of the ruts, which were, we are assured, often three or four feet deep. In marshy ground and at the frequent fords they were often literally impassable. It was very unusual for the best of the few coaches running to average six miles an hour. Apart from these roads there were a vast number of tracks running all over the country which had much the appearance of the green lanes which we still find commonly in some parts of England, especially in the chalk districts. Along these toiled most of the inland trade of the country laboriously borne by pack-horses and mules, and great numbers of cattle, sheep, and poultry driven either to the local markets or towards London for the consumption of the one great city. The change which came about was mainly the work of three men of humble origin: Metcalf, who strangely enough had been blind from his youth; Telford, who was also a great bridge-builder; and McAdam, a Scotsman. The principles on which they revolutionised the roads were three. First, they widened them so that two coaches could pass without one or both being driven into the gutter, and gave them

the modern camber to prevent the water from lying on and rotting the flat surface. Secondly, they improved the gradients, avoiding isolated hills straight over which the old roads had gone, and where hills had to be climbed, taking routes which did not exhaust the horses. Even to this day our hills in England are apt to be much steeper than those on the Continent, partly no doubt because they are shorter, but also because we have never had to adapt them to the movement of troops on a large scale owing to our insular position. As they smoothed hills, so also they raised valleys by building the roads on causeways and carrying them over rivers and streams by bridges. Finally, they discovered a scientific method of metalling, by which the large stones were laid at the bottom, small ones properly broken up at the top, with gravel as a cement. The adjective "macadamised" as applied to such roads seems now to be going out of use, but for more than a hundred years it kept alive the name of the perfector of the system.

Naturally the number of stage-coaches multiplied; by 1820 there were about 2500 plying for hire in England. Their speed over long journeys was almost double the old speed over short distances. In 1820 Sir Walter Scott travelled back to Scotland from London at an average pace of ten miles an hour, which was thought amazing. It is worth noticing that these great improvements were nearly all the work of the local turnpike trusts, who recouped themselves for their expense by the establishment of frequent toll-houses, of which a few remain to this day on bridges.

The Industrial Revolution. It is clear that this great movement assumed for its development the existence of a large amount of capital at the disposal of industry. It was mainly because England was so much more capitalised than any continental country, except perhaps Holland, that

it led the way so boldly in the changes with which we have to deal. The settling of the finances of the country on a firm basis entirely controlled by the House of Commons, the establishment of a banking system, the security and moderation of government at home with the gradual disappearance of any threat of civil war—all these both encouraged people to save on a large scale, and also to feel sufficient confidence to invest their savings readily in industry. The vast profits of the colonial and carrying trades went on growing steadily from the Peace of Utrecht, being on balance increased rather than hampered by war.

Now by about 1760 it seems to be true that English textile manufacturers were in great difficulties. They found it almost impossible to turn out enough stuff to fulfil the increasingly large foreign orders which were coming in; and further had to pay so high for labour, which was becoming scarce, that they had the most compelling reasons for increasing the quantity and decreasing the cost of production. Such a situation was bound to stimulate the ingeniousness of inventors.

The great question was, therefore, how to develop new power. It was only a little later on that Boulton, who had financed Watt and taken him into partnership, boasted to George III., "I sell what all the world desires, power." First came the development of water power, which had obvious disadvantages; it could be applied only in hilly country, such as much of Lancashire and Yorkshire; it was liable to serious irregularities as there might be too much water in the stream or there might be too little. Hence after 1782, when Watt succeeded, after many trials and disappointments, in perfecting the steam-engine, it began to be superseded by steam. But the use of steam itself led directly to other revolutions in industry. It required immense quantities of fuel. Before the middle

of the eighteenth century very little coal was raised in England, it is said not more than 5,000,000 tons, or less than 2 per cent. of what we raise to-day. Charcoal had been used for smelting iron, with the result that the great forests of the Middle Ages had almost disappeared. Turf and wood were mainly used for domestic consumption, for "sea coal" was thought to be unhealthy, and we read in *Pepys's Diary* nearly a hundred years earlier his complaints of its use in London. The steam-engine gave, therefore, as everyone knows, an enormous impetus to the production of coal, so that Great Britain became in the nineteenth century not merely the largest consumer, but the largest exporter of coal in the world. Again, it is clear that the steam-engine requires to be made of iron, and that the factories in which it is made will require a great deal of the same metal for its production. Therefore the increase in the production of iron followed concurrently with that of coal. England was singularly favoured by nature in this respect, as the coal- and iron-fields for the most part lie near each other, near the chief areas of cotton and woollen manufactory, and also near the sea. So great economy was rendered possible in the price of production and transport. Again, as more iron was produced more uses were found for it; iron bridges began to spring up all over the kingdom, and it is not far outside our period before the iron ship with the steam-engine inside begins to become common on the sea. Obviously all these giant expansions of industry would be possible only if the population itself was rapidly expanding. An increase had already begun in the first half of the century, which seems to have brought the population of England and Wales from about six to nearly seven millions. But henceforward it went on with great rapidity, until in our last decade it amounted to the very large figure of

18 per cent.; and England and Wales by 1821 contained more than 11,000,000 inhabitants. Yet in spite of this increase there was no general surplus of labour; on the contrary, the concentration of machinery in factories made it possible and profitable to employ children of five years old or under to perform the many simple mechanical tasks. But though there was an apparently inexhaustible demand for cheap unskilled labour, the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour naturally fell off. Consequently a large number of men and women who had done weaving in their homes, who had not been seriously affected by the earlier inventions of the spinning-jenny, or even the water-power looms, were thrown out of employment, and could not even get an inferior unskilled job, as here they were cut out by the cheaper wages of the children, who were forced to work for periods of twelve and fourteen hours a day. So it is not surprising that whenever depressions in trade coincided with a very high price of bread, as for instance in the years 1810–1812 and 1815–1820, the unrest took principally the form of attacking mills and destroying the machinery, which the workmen considered to be the reason for their misery and semi-starvation.

It was inevitable that there should be periodic fluctuations in trade of a wild description; for the export trade had grown so enormously, and had grown much quicker in proportion than the home trade. Moreover, during the Napoleonic wars, as we have seen when studying the continental system, foreign trade had to contend with every kind of difficulty and resort to every kind of furtive and ingenious expedition. After the peace it had to adapt itself to the needs of a generation which had been constantly at war, to get rid of the accumulation of war stocks as best it might, and to cater for new markets. It was an immense experiment to launch an industrial revolution concurrently

with a great war. Yet it is certainly true that the war which exhausted and desolated Europe gave Great Britain its finest opportunity, and ensured the long start in industrial supremacy which carried us safely over into the twentieth century.

It remains now briefly to sum up the main effects of the great changes which we have been describing. It is hardly necessary to emphasise the immense growth in national wealth which enabled us to pay without any serious difficulty—without, as has been shown, preserving the income tax—the interest on a national debt whose figure would have seemed inconceivably large even to the younger Pitt. It increased very largely the number of the "new rich," who had been in the earlier part of the century mainly drawn from the bankers and the "nabobs" of the East Indian trade. They began to wield political power in the House of Lords by the numerous creations of which the younger Pitt was the pioneer, and to exert social influence in the counties. It increased, moreover, the power of the rich over the poor, and decreased their personal relation with each other. Neither capitalists nor factories were, of course, new; we hear of them as far back as early Tudor times, but the whole scale of enterprise had become immeasurably greater. With the advent of machinery, factories became a necessity instead of a mere convenience. It is true that in 1820 the Revolution was very far from being completed; that it had principally affected the textile trades, and within their sphere the cotton industry, more powerfully than the woollen. It is true that there still remained many hand-loom workers, and more small factories of perhaps a dozen or less hands in a number of villages and small towns in the Midlands and North of England. But the tide was flowing irresistibly towards the concentration of industry in great buildings and in

great cities, and towards the formation everywhere of great limited companies, whose relation towards the individual workman is obviously even more impersonal than that of the great employer.

We leave the workman just at the period when he is having his hardest struggle. The principle of freeing industry from state restrictions and all artificial trammels was of great value in securing its indefinite expansion, as Adam Smith taught. But while the Government gave up all idea of regulating wages—the Spitalfields weavers seem to be the only body of men for whose benefit the Elizabethan method was extended into the nineteenth century—they deprived the working-man of any weapon of his own by forbidding combination under severe penalties. No doubt the masters were under a similar prohibition, but everyone knows that in practice it is utterly impossible to prevent them from combining if they are determined to do so. Again, in this period of transition, when there were so many opportunities to be gained or lost, education was the most crying need of the working-man, as practical thinkers like Cobbett and Place realised to the full. But no state education of any kind was provided, there was not even any grant in aid of education. Except for the Sunday Schools, which had been started by Robert Raikes towards the end of the eighteenth century, any organised attempt to educate the poor was still in its infancy.

So if we look forward across our period we find that the poor had become poorer, and had fallen more under the power of the rich. The history of the remainder of the nineteenth century is largely a record of their organisation, education, and attainment of political power.

The growth of population has been mentioned, but it is desirable to analyse shortly the character of that growth. It was by no means of a uniform character, for though

probably every county in England increased its inhabitants between 1760 and 1820, yet the rate of growth was widely different. In the west, south, and east of England it was slow and gradual with the exception of London, where the population probably doubled. In the Midlands and the North it was progressively more and more rapid. The population here tended, as one would expect, to flow from the country to the town, and to concentrate in thickly populated industrial areas, where even then one town rapidly succeeded another. Such areas were in particular Lancashire, the West Riding of Yorkshire, the country between Birmingham and Wolverhampton, and the Staffordshire district, which we call the Potteries, where Wedgwood had created such a vast and artistic industry. The figures for some of these towns are astounding: Manchester, for instance, grew from 20,000 to 145,000, and Birmingham from 27,000 to 106,000. As might be expected with such mushroom growths where no system of town-planning prevailed, these towns were built without any method, and all individuality of architecture was lost, so that the long grim streets consisting of houses exactly like each other, erected cheaply by contract, excited the repulsion of foreigners who visited England. It has been said, not without truth, by a modern industrial historian, that "the age that regarded men, women, and children as hands for feeding the machines of the new industry had no use for libraries, galleries, playgrounds, or any of the forms in which space and beauty can bring comfort or nourishment to the human mind. The new towns were built for a race that was allowed no leisure."

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL LIFE

General Contents of the Chapter. The title of this chapter probably sounds rather vague and indefinite ; it is made so intentionally, as its object is to point out some characteristic resemblances and differences between our life and that of our great-grandparents. Broadly speaking, it seems a true saying that "human nature does not change," if we confine its application to that period within which we have the material for any detailed history. It is, therefore, of great interest to see how our countrymen lived and thought under political and social conditions which were obviously very different from those of our own day, but which nevertheless often seem the more different just because they are so near us. For example, we might be tempted to say that one of the most important and instructive differences lies in the fact that the England of this chapter was essentially an aristocratic and the England of to-day essentially a democratic society. Yet it is surprising with what unanimity foreigners of the eighteenth century picked out the democratic features of English society as its distinguishing mark, just as to-day they pick out no less strikingly the "feudal," the "traditional," in short, the aristocratic features of English life as especially remarkable. It is, in fact, often through the aid of foreigners that we are able to see most vividly the continuity in our national life and character. For example, when Lord Ferrars was hanged

in 1748 for murdering his valet, it was regarded on the Continent as a marvellous proof that the law was no respecter of persons, even though he was permitted a silken rope in honour of his quality; but in 1900 when Earl Russell was tried for bigamy before his peers in the House of Lords it appeared a singular piece of anachronistic feudalism.

The Dominance of the Landowner. But it is unquestionably true that throughout the period the dominance of the landowner is the most important social fact. His influence lasted in a surprising way throughout the nineteenth century, and is far from dead to-day, but his power has nearly disappeared. But until the Reform Bill the whole of society was organised on the basis that power went with the ownership of land. As we saw, the law required every Member of Parliament to be a substantial landowner; the great landlords owned an actual majority of seats and both could and did make certain that the members expressed the views of their patrons. Almost the whole of the local government was in the hands of landowners, as, except in the towns, the justices of the peace consisted of the country squires with a number of the rectors. Originally the justices had been the agents of the central government in the counties and had been described in Tudor times as "those in whom the Prince putteth his especial trust." Now the sovereign Parliament was more and more disposed to give a free hand to their fellow-landowners. There was probably no other period in English history when there was so much decentralisation of power. They administered justice, and appeals went from the individual justices to the justices sitting together in Quarter Sessions. They administered the poor law, and, as we saw, were able by their decisions to supersede the whole of the existing law. They did practically all the work which is now shared out

between parish and county councils. In short, they were almost irresponsible autocrats. But, on the other hand, they had for the most part a strong sense of responsibility and a high capacity for doing their work, just because, unlike the Irish squire or the French noble, they lived on their estates, often farmed on a large scale, and knew their tenants and labourers intimately.

Harshness of the Legal System. Yet the landlord-justice had most serious defects. It took the line of least resistance. Instead of educating and improving the condition of the people, it assumed that it could succeed only by methods of terrorism. All through our period fresh offences of the most trivial kind were made punishable by death until they reached the amazing total of over two hundred. Burke said with a just bitterness that though his influence with government had never been sufficient to get a place for a friend, yet he knew well that any ministry would oblige him by creating a new felony without benefit of clergy.

This period is the best example in history of the fallacy of what is called the deterrent theory of punishment. The result of making so many trivial offences punishable by death was first to increase serious crime; for if hanging would be your penalty for robbing an old woman, it would obviously be safer to knock her on the head lest she should witness against you. It made prosecutors unwilling to come forward, juries unwilling to convict, and, perhaps worst of all, it left the criminal quite uncertain whether the death sentence would be carried out. In fact, it seems to have been commuted five times out of six.

Not only were punishments unduly heavy, they were apt also to be cruel. The pillory still survived, in which the unpopular criminal might be pelted almost to death; until nearly the end of the century women were still liable to be burnt for what was called petty treason—that is to

say, murdering their husbands or mistresses ; until 1819 they were still sentenced to public floggings. Soldiers and sailors were treated with astonishing brutality, sentences of 500 or 1000 lashes were not infrequently inflicted.

In the face of such a system of punishment it is not surprising that a vein of brutality ran through the English character, which seems now practically to have disappeared. The crowds which attended public executions were composed of all classes, and they were considered spectacles which respectable persons should attend at least once.

Drunkenness was exceedingly common in all classes, from the heir to the throne downwards ; even the austere Pitt was at least once so drunk in the House of Commons as to be incapable of speech. In London, gin palaces advertised that they would make their customers " drunk for a penny ; dead drunk for twopence," with straw to lie on supplied gratis.

The ferocity of the Gordon Riots, which astounded foreigners, seem largely to have been intensified by drink. It is reported that hundreds of people died from lapping up unrectified spirits which flowed from a pillaged distillery.

The Wesleyan Movement. It was perhaps to this vein of excitability that the Methodist movement owed part of its wonderful success. Certainly revivalist methods have never since had any success in England—as opposed to Wales—in any way comparable to those achieved by the two great apostles Wesley and Whitefield. The former refers frequently to the contortions and convulsions induced by his preaching ; he relates sometimes how the " arrow of the Spirit " would pierce small children of six or seven so that they would foam at the mouth and become senseless. The Wesleyan movement, in fact, supplied in abundance the two things which were so lacking in the

established church: religious fervour, which the bishops continued to denounce as "enthusiasm," and a spirit of what may be called Christian democracy. Nothing had been seen in England comparable to the great open-air preaching, where as many as 20,000 hearers often attended, and where none of the class distinctions could be observed as in the pews of a church or even a chapel. What high society thought of the Methodist doctrines is well illustrated by the singular letter which the Duchess of Buckingham wrote to Lady Huntingdon, Whitefield's titled protectress, who was celebrated as "one who wears a coronet and prays." "Their doctrines are most repulsive and strongly tinctured with impertinence and disrespect towards their superiors, in perpetually endeavouring to level all ranks and do away with all distinctions. It is monstrous to be told that you have a heart as sinful as the common wretches that crawl the earth. This is highly offensive and insulting, and I cannot but wonder that your ladyship should relish any sentiments so much at variance with high breeding and good society."

Position of the Established Church. It is easy to see that sentiments such as these would not be welcome if preached by ministers of the established church. There is probably no period in which the Church of England was more conscious of her establishment, or more convinced that "her strength is to sit still."

It would be untrue to think that there were not numbers of admirable parish priests who kept up the high standards associated with the Laudian traditions; but the Church suffered from two great evils. The class from which the higher clergy, particularly the bishops, was drawn was narrowly limited. George III. once said of a clergyman whom he justly admired, "Excellent man, excellent man; will never be a bishop." It has been calculated that in

1815 almost every bishop on the bench was either of noble birth, or had been the tutor to a nobleman.

The other evil was pluralism ; it was quite common for an influential clergyman to hold from four to six preferments ; bishops themselves would often augment their incomes by holding one or two valuable rectories. Hence the rector, unlike the squire, was in many cases non-resident ; and the hungry flock was not likely to be satisfied with the ministrations of a sweated curate living miserably in a cottage, and often galloping untidily each Sunday from church to church to supply several parishes with a hurried service.

Wilberforce and the Slave Trade. At the same time the Church maintained a great deal of life, largely borrowed from the Wesleyans in what was called the Evangelical Movement. Its great figure is William Wilberforce, who illustrates most strikingly the good that can be done by an independent Member of Parliament. He was returned time after time by immense majorities for the great county constituency of Yorkshire. The freeholders, who before had been accustomed to the corruption on an enormous scale practised by the rival Whig and Tory nobles, chose him as a very young man in the famous election of 1780, and never wavered in their adoring allegiance. Wilberforce had every quality which the philanthropist needs but seldom possesses. A gentleman of the most charming manners and tact, he had none of the arrogance of the self-righteous, and, in consequence, whether he gave private advice or spoke his mind in the House of Commons his influence was very great on very different types of mind. He devoted his life to the abolition of the slave trade, first in the British Empire, then in the whole world. He organised behind him such a compact and fervent humanitarian support, mainly drawn from the dissenters, that

undoubtedly there was no measure proposed at the Congress of Vienna which had behind it such universal middle and lower class enthusiasm. It was curious that it should have fallen to the lot of Castlereagh, himself described by Wilberforce as "a cold-blooded fellow" for his reasoned opposition to abolition, to urge it upon the sceptical band of European diplomatists, who believed that Great Britain, having fully stocked her colonies, was determined to prevent other nations from obtaining adequate supplies. However, a general resolution was passed to condemn it, and it was gradually abandoned by all civilised nations. Wilberforce then prepared the way for the abolition of slavery itself, and by a singular appropriateness the fulfilment of his labours was announced to him when he lay dying.

It has often been pointed out that the humanitarianism of Wilberforce and the "Clapham sect" of rich evangelicals was curiously limited by their social background; they are not associated with and seem even opposed to measures for educating or mitigating the sufferings of the poor at home. It was a practical business man, Sir Robert Peel, father of the future Prime Minister, who carried through the first inadequate act for limiting the hours of child labour. It was individual saints like John Howard, a dissenter, and later on Elizabeth Fry, a quakeress, who at great risk to themselves penetrated the repulsive prisons of the day, and did something, in spite of official indifference or discouragement, to alleviate the grosser sufferings of the inmates. It is curious that the mere instinct of self-preservation should not have induced the ministers of justice to show a little more humanity—as the gaol-fever which raged continuously in the prisons often attacked judge, counsel, and jury at the assizes. The bunches of sweet herbs which are presented to the judges at the opening of

the Law Courts preserve the memory of the time when their atmosphere resembled that of a charnel-house.

The Versatility of the Epoch. I doubt whether it is sufficiently realised how magnificent and many-sided an expression of national life was manifested in our period. We have already spoken of the men of action, who are themselves a singularly distinguished band ; we have seen what results were achieved by the economic pioneers. But apart from them, Great Britain was producing a wonderful roll of exceptional talent. Adam Smith was not only the greatest economist in Europe, but more than any one man the originator of the system of *laissez-faire* and free trade, which within half a century revolutionised the whole fabric of domestic and international trade. Jeremy Bentham had hardly less influence on the future course of government. It has been said with little exaggeration that the legislation of the half-century which succeeded the Reform Bill was nothing but applied Benthamism. He judged every institution by its utility. The first question you must always ask is " What is the use of it ? " Now everything must be useful for something ; and Bentham defined utility as that which promotes " the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Happiness itself he defined as the excess of pleasure over pain. Therefore the whole standard of statesmen and legislatures must be to provide as many people as possible with the greatest possible amount of social pleasure. This theory was obviously the very contrary of what we have described as the Eldonian Toryism, which accepted everything as good, however incongruous a patchwork it made, provided it was in existence. The old Toryism put up a remarkably good fight, and Canning was the first great Conservative to begin attacking it. Its strength was, of course, largely borrowed from the great political philosopher Burke, who, especially in his later

days, combined a most magnificent conception of what states and empires should be with an extraordinary dexterity of working into the pattern many of the existing abuses. His voice was raised in the same passionate eloquence in defence of the American colonists and of the rotten boroughs. While foremost in promoting economical reform and the suppression of placemen, he regarded the British Constitution, the finished creation of the "glorious revolution," as a work of more than human wisdom. Hence the French Revolution seemed to him the negation of all that ordered liberty which the British had given as an example to the world; and his apparent indifference to the sufferings of the French people led Tom Paine to say of his laments over the Royal Family and the nobles, that "he pitied the plumage and forgot the dying bird." "The price of liberty," he once wrote, "is eternal vigilance"; but towards the close of his life he seemed to suppose that liberty in England could be maintained only by the suppression of all who opposed the Government, while his crusade against "the Regicide Republic" would have committed us to an indefinite war of opinion against France.

Gibbon again in the sphere of history was universally recognised as the most eminent man of his day, both for his literary ability—there has never been a historian who provided so many brilliant and profound epigrams—and for his scientific method, in which he was the true forerunner of the exact research of the nineteenth century. Both he and Bentham had been educated at the University of Oxford, but neither had a good word to say for his *Alma Mater*. Bentham complained that nobody had endeavoured to teach him anything at Queen's; Gibbon pilloried the fellows of Magdalen by the characteristic remark that "their dull and deep potations excused the

brisk intemperance of youth." It is undoubtedly true that Oxford, and to a slightly less extent Cambridge, had fallen into a sluggish torpor unexampled in their long history. The number of undergraduates at either had fallen to perhaps three hundred; the Universities, carefully protected by religious tests, were regarded as the idle nursing-mothers of the selected few, who were later to rise to high places in Church and State. No examination except a formal parody of the mediæval tests were exacted, and any "enthusiasm" was promptly repressed, as the unfortunate undergraduates of St Edmund Hall discovered when they were ignominiously sent down for professing Methodism. It cannot therefore be said that the great men of learning owed their training to the English Universities.

Influence of the French Revolution on Literature. But it was not merely in these spheres that we can look for unusual distinction. The French Revolution evoked, first by attraction, then by repulsion, a new school of poetry. Wordsworth and Coleridge in particular were started on their career by the exaltation of what was supposed to be the greatest movement in history towards the consummation of human freedom. Just as Fox wrote of the capture of the Bastille, "How much the greatest event in the history of the world and how much the best," so Wordsworth expressed the view that "to be young" in those days "was very heaven." The disillusionment which followed these extravagantly rosy enthusiasms did not stop, but turned the direction of these poetic mills. Wordsworth's recantation turned him towards nature and its mysterious but ordered processes in which to trace the mind of God and the path of duty. The lessons to be drawn from the inanimate world were contrasted with the windy political gospels of the cosmopolitan revolution.

From another point of view also the reaction created

great literature. The French Revolution emphasised its anti-historical character, " Behold I make all things new." One of the most effective answers was to emphasise the romance and the living continuity of past history. This was the great work of Sir Walter Scott, who made in his novels the past to live with at least as much vividness as the present. To carry men's minds backward to an appreciative understanding of the past is to steady them ; and therefore it is natural to find the whole of Europe embracing as a thrilling antidote what became known as the " Romantic Movement."

We have to look forward to the last decade of the period to find the first notable expression of the true revolutionary spirit in the world of two young aristocrats. Byron, it is true, was largely actuated by a desire to revenge himself upon a society which found his immoralities intolerable, but Shelley is the type of the true anarchist, who is so violent with his pen just because his nature is so gentle ; so extravagant in his visions because his mind is so exquisitely sensitive and unworldly.

But if we want to see exactly how the ordinary middle-class world of the hall, the rectory, and the country town lived through all these stirring years, we have only to turn to Jane Austen's novels. There we can see with what orderly tranquillity they all pursued their unexciting paths, how little they seem to have been affected by foreign war and domestic crisis. Ordinary people will, it is true, lead their ordinary lives in all circumstances as far as may be ; but Jane Austen's revealing pen shows how large a measure of comfortable seclusion was still possible for the sheltered classes during the severest stress of a war which we rightly considered an unique national effort. It is by such works that history can be placed in a just proportion.

British Painting. Space would fail even to provide a

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bare catalogue of all the other notable features of this epoch. It remains, in conclusion, to point out that we developed for the first time a school of native British painting of the highest rank. Both in the landscapes of Constable, Gainsborough, and Turner, and in the portraits of Reynolds, Gainsborough, Romney, and Raeburn, British art showed itself at least equal to any contemporary productions in Europe. For versatility of excellence the Georgian age is unsurpassed by any epoch of our history.

CHAPTER XVI

IRELAND

General Relationship of England to Ireland. It would be impossible in a textbook of this size to have a chapter on Scotland ; it would be equally impossible not to have one on Ireland. This difference is a measure of the different relationships in which the two countries stood towards the course of British history. Scotland had been taken into partnership, and her co-operation with England proved lucrative to the former, and valuable to the latter beyond all possible anticipation.

Since the suppression of the '45 there has been no English policy towards Scotland ; but there has always been an English policy towards Ireland, which—whatever the intentions of its promoters—has been almost invariably unfortunate in its results.

Restrictions on Roman Catholics. In 1760 Ireland was treated in most respects as a hostile land and suspect dependency. The elaborate and crushing provisions of the Penal Code still survived intact to mark the fourth conquest of the country under William III. for the benefit of the Protestant minority. It is true that these laws were enforced with much less severity than in the beginning of the century. But legally a Roman Catholic was incapable of acquiring land, of entering most professions, of serving the Crown in any civil or military capacity. The exercise of his religion was permitted only under humiliating

restrictions. Such was the status of four-fifths of the inhabitants.

On Legislative Independence and Trade. It might be supposed that as an English and Protestant "garrison" existed in Ireland it would be encouraged in every possible way to govern the country. This, however, was far from being the case; the Protestants were given ascendancy without responsibility, a sure method of encouraging the worst form of arrogance towards the subject majority. The policy of dividing the minority against itself was also singularly foolish, as all Presbyterians naturally disliked paying tithes for an established church, which they regarded as non-scriptural and knew to command the nominal allegiance of about one-seventh of the whole Irish population. The executive government at Dublin Castle was entirely in the hands of a narrow and often corrupt English connection. The complete dependence of the Irish Parliament on the Privy Council which Henry VII. had instituted by Poynings's Law was still in full operation. Moreover, the British Parliament had been expressly given the power in George I.'s reign of passing laws to bind Ireland without her consent. The Parliament itself was little better than a farce, for, as the Septennial Act was not applied to Ireland, it was dissolved only on the death of the sovereign, and met only every second year. Further, the Protestants were equally subjected to the commercial restrictions, which, as I mentioned earlier in this book, were far more severe than those imposed upon the American colonies. This was the more galling as the Scotch Union had provided for absolute free trade between the two countries. Ireland, on the contrary, was entirely excluded from the Navigation Act, which meant that she could have no share whatever in the vast colonial trade. Her woollen industry had been deliberately suppressed in William III.'s reign from fear of competition

with its English rival. Irish cattle might not be exported into England. Though in compensation a promise was made to foster the linen industry, no bounties began to be paid to it until 1743, and their value never exceeded £13,000 per annum. But in spite of all these grim bars to prosperity, the condition of Ireland had greatly improved during the eighteenth century. It had enjoyed an immunity from rebellion and serious civil disorder for seventy years. A number of the more enterprising and turbulent spirits had emigrated, to perform many famous deeds in the armies of foreign sovereigns, particularly the French. The Protestants themselves no longer constantly referred to their Roman Catholic compatriots as "the common enemy"; they often helped them to evade the rigour of the land laws. Moreover, they began to feel the humiliation of their own position of continually "kneeling to England on the necks of their countrymen," as Grattan so imaginatively said. They began to rebel against the autocratic handful of noblemen and officials from England who monopolised power and waxed fat on the proceeds. They began to form an Irish party in the Legislature which was a reflection of the sanest and most moderate political opinion in the country. The way, in short, was being prepared for a co-operation of the two races and the two religions during the last third of the century, whose compelling motive was to take advantage of the difficulties of England. It was this partial and temporary union which alone made serious agitation and rebellion possible; for it is noteworthy that no echo of the Jacobite disturbances of 1715 and 1745 was heard in Ireland. The agrarian outrages of the Houghers and Whiteboys were the only troubles during the greater part of the eighteenth century; and such outrages are a normal incident of Irish history.

Effect of the American Revolution on Ireland. The out-

break of the American War was a natural stimulus towards Irish independence. It created new grievances for the island: increased taxation to pay for the war and for the increasing national debt, stoppage of the lucrative contraband trade with France as soon as the war extended to Europe. The withdrawal of the greater part of the army left no more than 5000 men in Ireland. The grievances of the colonists were contrasted with the far heavier burdens which England laid upon Ireland as a matter of course, though the right of Ireland to tax herself had remained unquestioned. In consequence, the movement which started with the ostensible reason of raising volunteers for defence against the French soon became general in its scope. It is said that at least 40,000 volunteers were under arms by 1780, mainly Protestant, and encouraged by the leading families, but with an admixture of Roman Catholics. Their zeal for defence against the common enemy was more and more obscured by their determination to extract from the British Parliament a grant of legislative independence. Lord North had already consented to the destruction in a very large degree of their commercial restrictions in 1779; while the Roman Catholics had been allowed to acquire land and to practise their religion more freely.

Grant of Legislative Independence. But as almost always happens, these large concessions—which would have received an incredulous welcome some years earlier—were now found insufficient. The acceptance by the Irish Parliament of the full volunteer programme in 1782, which it had hitherto refused, was the decisive stage. Neither the Cabinet nor the House of Commons was willing or able to resist. The whole of the restrictions on the legislative independence of Ireland were swept away; and for the next sixteen years the links between the two countries

were restricted to the Crown and the executive at Dublin Castle, dominated by and responsible to the Cabinet at London. The main credit for this revolution was due to Henry Grattan, the great Irish orator, who, by transferring the controversy as far as possible from the Volunteers to the Irish Parliament, veiled the threat of force and enabled England to save her face.

Grattan's Parliament. The first independent Parliament is therefore generally known in history by the name of the Irish patriot. It was, however, a very unsatisfactory body. The House of Commons, which resisted any attempt to reform itself, composed of Protestants and elected by a very narrow Protestant franchise, was corrupted by the fact that two-thirds of its members represented pocket boroughs, whilst at least one-third were pensioners of the Crown. The House of Lords was mainly under the control of the bishops and other government hacks. No measure of any importance was passed during the years 1782–1789, much to the satisfaction of Dublin Castle, which continued to govern Ireland amidst English indifference in the way which it was rightly supposed that England would favour. The only sign of independence consisted in the silly action of the Irish Parliament in creating the Prince of Wales as Regent without any restrictions in 1788; appropriately enough the deputation to congratulate him arrived in England after the recovery of George, and was greeted with contemptuous merriment.

Effect of the French Revolution on Ireland. Ireland was far more profoundly affected than any other part of the British Islands by the revolution. This was natural and inevitable; for both Roman Catholics and Presbyterians contrasted their own subjected condition with a France which had swept away all distinctions between citizens, destroyed the power of the land-owners, and abolished tithe.

The example of the secret societies which had worked such wonders in promoting the revolution was not lost on Irishmen, who have always shown a sinister genius for such anti-social methods. They soon began to assume most formidable proportions. Wolfe Tone, a young, ill-balanced Protestant visionary, founded the United Irishmen, whose object was to link together in an armed band Presbyterians and Roman Catholics. It is probable that from the first he aimed at the fomenting of rebellion, though most of his followers did not. In Ulster the Catholic Defenders, who were pledged to resist the payment of tithe, were countered by the Protestant Orange Society, a militant and aggressive guarantee of the existing state of things. It became more and more obvious that Ireland was drifting through anarchy to rebellion, after war broke out with France. Largely through Pitt's instrumentality the Roman Catholics were given the franchise on the same terms as Protestants in 1793, though still ineligible to sit in the House of Commons. In 1794 Lord Fitzwilliam was sent as Viceroy, with a free hand, as he believed, to change the whole system of government in Dublin. It would have been far better not to have sent him than to have rudely dashed the cup of expectation by recalling him as soon as he proceeded to dismiss some of "the old gang," even though he seems to have broken a verbal understanding with the Cabinet not to take any decisive step without their further explicit consent.

We have seen what serious discontent the prolonged and sterile war created in England. It is not surprising that after this great disappointment the more extreme Irishmen began to turn their eyes to the supposed liberators in France, whose agents had been secretly fomenting revolt since 1793. The attempted landing at the end of 1796 was a complete failure, though Wolfe Tone had induced the

Directory to embark a force of 15,000 men. It was also premature, as the Roman Catholic population in general showed no signs of supporting it. But the Viceroy, Lord Camden, in 1797 did his best to popularise rebellion by the cruel methods of repression employed by the soldiers and militia in Ulster and Leinster. When Abercromby became Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1797 he noticed two things: "the greatest despondency among the gentlemen, who believe, or affect to believe, that there is a plot in every family and a conspiracy in every parish"; and "the state of licentiousness" of the army, "which must render it formidable to everyone except the enemy."

The Rebellion of 1798. The rebellion, or rather rebellions, of this year were badly concerted, and marked by the most horrible atrocities on either side. It would clearly have been in the interest of the rebels to avoid a religious war of Roman Catholic against Protestant, and to have timed their rising to coincide with a French landing. Neither of these things was done. In Wexford and Wicklow, the south-eastern counties, the peasants, led by fanatical priests like Father John Murphy, treated the Protestants as their natural enemies, after the manner of 1641. Consequently there was no support extended from Ulster, where the preparations had been most extensive and efficient. The rebellion started in the end of May and was crushed before General Humbert arrived in August with a force of 1100 Frenchmen at Killala Bay in the north-west. He found little support beyond local disturbances, and after occupying the attention of 11,000 troops for a fortnight was compelled to surrender. Torture and wholesale executions, often without the summary formality of martial law, had marked the course of this miserable outburst. The policy of the Government, however, after peace had been restored was moderate; for Pitt had made up his mind that a union

of the two countries was necessary, and wished it to be consummated under as fair auspices as possible.

The Union. It seemed obvious to most people in Great Britain that the experiment of 1782 had broken down, and, if continued, must mean that whenever a European war was in progress Ireland would remain a danger spot. It was reported in 1799 that 40,000 troops were not sufficient to hold the island in subjection, and so large a drain on British man-power must seriously affect her capacity for effective continental intervention. Every method of governing Ireland had now been tried except a legislative union. The precedent of the Scottish union was of fortunate augury, for Scotland had been treated with extreme harshness in the preceding half-century, the country as a whole had been hostile to the measure, yet after its accomplishment the difficulties of governing the country diminished, and had disappeared soon after the middle of the century. The two great problems for the Cabinet were, therefore, on what terms the Union should be consummated; and, secondly, how to induce the Irish Parliament to consent to its own extinction. Pitt desired a comprehensive measure which would deal with the Catholic claims, would admit them to Parliament and to office, would free them from paying a Protestant tithe, and would give support to the Catholic priesthood. He made no secret of his intentions to Lord Cornwallis, the Viceroy, who, relying upon them, gained a good deal of Catholic support. But he refrained from putting these conditions into the Act of Union, probably because he thought that the King's obstinacy could be more readily overcome afterwards, if, faced with the Union as a *fait accompli*, he could be induced to recognise the religious concessions as an inevitable sequel. Accordingly the Act bears a more narrow and legal aspect than its Scottish counterpart. The Irish Parliament was

extinguished and a hundred members added to the Imperial Assembly at Westminster, though Ireland still retained a separate administration, exchequer, and judicature. Commercial equality was established between the two countries on the lines which Pitt had unsuccessfully recommended to the House of Commons as far back as 1785; whilst a complicated system of financial adjustment was laid down, which either country for long continued to condemn as grossly unfair.

The task of persuading the Irish Parliament to accept it was unpleasing and sordid. The honourable Lord Cornwallis wrote: "I despise and hate myself every hour for engaging in such dirty work, and am supported only by the reflection that without a Union the British Empire must be dissolved." His chief secretary, Castlereagh, engaged in it with greater apparent zest, and declared that he was "buying up the fee simple of Irish corruption." By the standards of the time the large sums given to borough-owners as compensation for the extinction of their property were fully justified; for Pitt's proposals of Parliamentary reform in 1785 had proceeded on exactly the same principle. But beyond this disbursement, payments were made to secure the votes of individual members, and over forty steps were given in the Irish peerage. But it must be remembered that little more than half a century back the Duke of Newcastle was flinging the same methods wholesale about the British Parliament to gain support for far less important objects.

Ireland after the Union. We have already seen what was the effect on British politics of George's refusal to consent to Roman Catholic relief. The Irish naturally regarded the Union as having been obtained by hypocritical treachery, especially when Pitt's pledge relegated all reopening of the subject to some indefinite period in the

future, after the King's death. They were the more confirmed in this view by seeing the support given to the militant Orange societies by many influential English, including two of the King's sons, which they interpreted as an intention to revive the Protestant ascendancy on an even surer basis by securing active English sympathy.

The Irish members made singularly little difference to the House of Commons; they were under-represented, for, on a population basis, Ireland should have had nearly a third, instead of less than a sixth, of the total number, and had little organisation. Individuals like Grattan might stand out, but their distinction was that of individuals, not of autocratic leaders like Parnell, the Nationalist leader in Gladstone's time, whose voice an organised phalanx obeyed. Westminster was not, therefore, the focus of Irish political agitation; a great movement was being built up among the peasants in Ireland by an eloquent, blustering, and masterful lawyer, O'Connell, who received later on the title of "Liberator." He was preparing, through the influence of the priesthood, that vast organisation in favour of the Roman Catholic claims which was to startle England out of its apathy by the Clare election of 1828. It is not necessary to describe in detail its beginning, as O'Connell's importance lies definitely outside our period. During these twenty years of comparative quiescence the country increased very considerably in natural prosperity. The commercial classes benefited by the new equality of trade, and the peasants—almost all of whom were small occupiers—by the high price of corn during the Napoleonic wars. But this prosperity was of the most precarious character; the increase of population far outstripped the capacity of the country to maintain it in normal times, especially under the traditional system of land-tenure, which offered no inducements to any kind of improvement.

Ireland by 1820 already contained about 6,000,000 inhabitants, or one-quarter more than the present-day figure. A large proportion of them were already dependent for mere existence on the success of the potato crop; and during the years 1815–1820 famines were already occurring on a formidable scale, precursors of that great catastrophe of 1846 which was to bring about the repeal of the Corn Laws and the constant flow of large-scale emigration, which in sixty years reduced the population by a half.

CHAPTER XVII

INDIA AND THE EMPIRE

Theory of Empire. It is natural to ask what was the meaning at that period of the British Empire—a phrase seldom used by contemporaries—and what was its relation to British India? Now Englishmen have always been averse from theorising about their system of government, and, indeed, foreigners have often accused us of being incapable of understanding general ideas. Certainly it is true that until very recent years it would have been very difficult to discover exactly what was meant by our Empire, except the possession of large quantities of the world's surface. But, on the other hand, this difficulty is mainly due to the extremely dissimilar character of the component parts which make up the Empire, and which it is impossible to classify under a single head. And this is not a new characteristic; on the contrary, we find the same diversities on a smaller scale in our period. The idea of maintaining and extending the supremacy of British trade was doubtless then a more compelling motive for the expansion of Britain and for the treatment of the dependencies than at any other period. Our rule in India, indeed, is far the most striking example in history of the interdependence of the commercial and the imperial motive, or, more accurately, of the way in which the latter grew half-unsuspected out of the former. Yet the rule of a company, even when regulated and controlled by the state, over Indians for

the primary purpose of paying dividends is essentially different from the grant of democratic institutions to British emigrants and their descendants, even though the main purpose here also was to increase the trade of the mother country. Again, where exactly can we draw the line between commercial and strategic aims ? Were the West Indian Islands valued primarily for their vast wealth as producers of sugar and owners and buyers of slaves, or for their high strategic value as outposts for the command of North America ? Canada was regarded much more with a military eye in 1763 than in 1820. On the other hand, many of our possessions were acquired or maintained simply on strategic grounds. Gibraltar and Malta, Mauritius and the Cape, were regarded as the fortresses and the naval stations indispensable for the success of our wide-flung policy as a world-power. Australia again was regarded by the Government simply as a dumping ground for convicts who had been shipped to the American colonies previous to the outbreak of war. In fact, in contrast to seventeenth-century practice, the policy of encouraging emigration had practically died out, mainly no doubt because so few people wanted to emigrate. A settled government, more tolerant religious policy, a constant increase in wealth, all tended to keep the population at home. There was no more than a thin trickle to Canada and, in the last few years of our period, to the Cape and Australia. The proportion of British stock, therefore, after the loss of America, to the total area and population of our dependencies was extraordinarily small. But Great Britain was already faced with every kind of imperial problem. In West Africa and the Cape we ruled negro savages, in the West Indies held in subjection a vast slave population of the same origin ; in the East Indies we ruled more than 50,000,000 Indians of different races, civilisation, and religion, in Canada

200,000 Frenchmen, in the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon Dutchmen, in Gibraltar Spaniards, and in the Ionian Islands Greeks.

It would be wholly untrue to say that all these diverse peoples were governed solely for the benefit of our own trade ascendancy or military and naval necessities. When Burke solemnly asserted that we were trustees for the people of India, he was laying down a doctrine which received more and more general assent. He meant that if we undertook the responsibility of governing Indians we were bound to provide them with good government; we were, so to speak, trustees for peoples who would remain perpetually minors. Nowadays when we speak of trusteeship we mean or pretend to mean that we shall exercise our authority only during a minority; that, in short, it is intended as a step towards eventual self-government. Now we speak of backward races, but until recently we spoke of inferior races; and there is an immense difference between the implications of the two adjectives. The agitations against the slave trade and against slavery itself were inspired by the same idea, that it was a disgrace to a civilised empire to allow such things to happen when it had the power to prevent them.

It is a curious paradox that whereas we lost by rebellion the colonists of our own stock, we have succeeded in permanently attaching to the British allegiance several million descendants of other European nations. The reason, doubtless, was that the British colonists felt no gratitude for the large instalments of a freedom which they conceived to be fully theirs by birthright, whereas the conquered foreigners were thankful to find themselves treated with justice and consideration, and respect for their customs and traditions, beyond their anticipations. Even before the Peace of Paris the instructions given to General Gage

for the treatment of the Canadians ran as follows: "These newly acquired subjects, when they have taken the oath, are as much His Majesty's subjects as any of us, and are, so long as they remain deserving of it, entitled to the same protection." Their system of law was maintained intact, their language fully respected and safeguarded, and their religion established. The best proof of the wisdom of this large policy was seen during the American War, when the colonists found it impossible to persuade the Canadians to take any part in the rebellion. The same policy was at first adopted in Cape Colony, where the Dutch institutions were maintained intact, though friction soon arose from the divergent views of the Dutch and the English as to the treatment of the natives. One of the most striking examples of a broad, enlightened administration, animated by a desire for the good of the governed, is that of Sir Stamford Raffles in Java and the Malay Peninsula. In 1815 Capo d'Istria, the Foreign Minister of the Czar, persuaded the Congress of Vienna to give Great Britain a protectorate over the Ionian Islands, which included his birthplace Corfu, on the ground that she could be trusted to treat his beloved Greeks with a wise liberality. That the mother country was not averse from the grant of representative institutions, where they seemed appropriate, is proved by the Canada Act of 1791, which divided the country into the two provinces of Lower and Upper Canada, with separate Councils and Assemblies sitting at Quebec and Ontario. This measure had the unfortunate but probably inevitable result of perpetuating the division between the two races, but its defects only became slowly apparent after half a century of experience. But it would be affectation to assert that any widespread interest was normally taken in the colonies either by the Cabinet, Parliament, or the public. It is surprising how readily we gave up the majority of our

conquests at the close of each successful war. The colonies ceased in 1794 to have any separate department in the Government. Up till then a Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations had been charged with their administration, but henceforward its powers were transferred to the new Secretary of State for War. It is really astonishing how little pride we have felt in our empire, and how little attention we have paid to it during most of the time that we have been laboriously building it up.

India : The Establishment of British Supremacy. The case of India was, however, different. The exploits of the Company did undoubtedly catch the public imagination ; moreover, it provided lucrative careers for many younger sons, it brought immense wealth into the country when the " nabobs " returned, and the wealth was so used as to procure great political influence. At the commencement of our period the Company had just emerged from its trading chrysalis into a full-blown territorial power. The conjunction of several causes had rendered this change inevitable. The miserable decay into which the old Mogul empire had sunk, partly through its own feebleness, partly through the Mahratta invasions, had resulted in the establishment of numerous rulers independent in all but name. The rivalry of the French and British throughout the world had its counterpart in India, where either company sought to enlist the support of these princes against the other. The great discovery, first made by the French, that native soldiers officered and drilled by Europeans made very effective troops increased very considerably the man-power of the rivals, who were able to wage war on one another with much larger forces. Bengal was secured by Clive, and Madras by Eyre Coote. The Peace of Paris left us without a rival, as the French were confined to Pondicherry

and one or two other trading-stations. Two great problems occupy the remainder of the period : first, the methods by which the home Government established and made more effective its control over the Company ; secondly, our imperial policy in India itself, which resulted by 1822 in an enormous increase in British rule, whether directly or indirectly exercised.

Relations of the Company with the Home Government. Clive, who was a remarkably far-seeing statesman as well as a soldier of genius, had recommended that the newly acquired empire should be recognised as such, and taken under the direct control of the Crown with a governor-general in Bengal. He proved a century before his time in thus anticipating the future. A governor-general was indeed set up by Lord North in 1773 ; but he was hampered in his administration by a council of four who could outvote him by a bare majority. Moreover, his relationships to the Crown and the Directors of the Company were ill defined. It was by no means clear whether his chief object in governing the country was to protect the natives or to secure for the Company a reasonable dividend. Yet, with its imperfections, the Regulating Act was a new departure, and as such was bitterly assailed by the Company as a violation of its charter. It certainly did not work well ; Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, found himself constantly thwarted by the factious opposition of three of his council ; while the Company refused to recall him when requested to do so by the Secretary of State in 1781. It was clear that without amendment the Act perpetuated an impossible dualism in India. Fox and North endeavoured to amend its defects by the India Bill of 1783. As we saw, this measure was not rejected on its merits, but by a violent royal intrigue ; it was, however, easily assailable by the shafts of party criticism. For it created a board of

seven commissioners, who were to supersede the Company for all important questions of administration and patronage; and these men were to be nominated for four years by Parliament, and afterwards by the Crown. It was easy to allege that this body of men would use their powers corruptly in the interest of the Whigs, and the Bill was certainly growing more and more unpopular before George's intervention killed it. The compromise adopted by Pitt next year had at least the merit of being long-lived, for it lasted until the dissolution of the Company after the Mutiny. The directors this time were allowed to retain their patronage, though it actually fell to a large extent into the hands of the ministers. But the political power was vested in a board of control, consisting of two Cabinet Ministers and Privy Councillors appointed by the Crown. The Crown also appointed and removed the governor-general and the provincial governors; while the powers of the latter were subordinated to the supreme direction of the former. Although it was alleged with superficial accuracy that a system of dual control was still in operation, yet in practice a strong governor-general could direct policy and declare peace and war at will.

British Policy in India. It is much easier to assume responsibilities than to limit them at will. This is the lesson which British statesmen and governor-generals have had constantly to learn under new conditions, as every generation brought new problems urgently demanding solution. India is not a nation, but a collection of peoples, nations, languages, and religions, which had fallen into a position of extreme political decadence in the eighteenth century. The East India Company represented the only power which was capable of exercising the functions of efficient government, and creating within the borders of its rule that peace and order which were so necessary for

the success of its trading operations. Moreover, the peace of 1763 had placed the Company in a territorial position, which made it necessary to go forward if it was to keep what it had gained. There was no logical alternative between leaving India and becoming the paramount power in India. The British were firmly established in the west at Bombay, in the south at Madras, and in the north-east in Bengal. It was a natural policy to link up these scattered possessions, not necessarily by a plan of systematic conquest, but by the extension of a predominant influence. The problem in India was from the first a problem of frontiers. During our period it consisted mainly in extending the frontiers of peace ; later on it became rather a search for military frontiers based on scientific principles, which would secure the defence of India as a whole against any threatening power from without. It must not, therefore, be supposed that the great governor-generals like Warren Hastings or Lord Wellesley were eager for conquest ; it is not denied now that their actions, taken as a whole, were inspired by a boldly conceived defensive spirit. Warren Hastings himself stated that his aim " was to make the British nation paramount in India, and to accept the allegiance of such of our neighbours as shall sue to be enlisted as the friends and allies of the King of Great Britain." Hastings, in short, inaugurated the system which has been gradually extended to such a pitch of harmonious efficiency, of leaving the native rulers on their thrones, but controlling their foreign relations and ensuring their subjects against any scandalous misgovernment. War was regarded as only a second-best policy, necessary in the Virgilian phrase *debellare superbos*. For success three things were necessary. First, a succession of first-rate men as governors-general, detached as far as possible from any close dependence on British political parties, and not afraid of assuming great

responsibilities. Warren Hastings, the most bitterly attacked, stands out as the greatest of a notable gallery of figures. He combined the enthusiastic energy of a pioneer with the majestic fearlessness of a great proconsul. His acquittal after a seven years' trial has been fully vindicated by posterity; and in spite of his accusers he remains an embodiment of British justice as well as of British power. Secondly, a high standard in the officers of the Company, which had been sadly lacking in the earlier part of the eighteenth century. If young men were sent out to India with inadequate salaries and were encouraged to make their fortunes quickly, it was certain that they would not gain the respect of the natives. The servants of the Company were, therefore, prohibited from trading and taking gifts, and were given salaries which were sufficient not merely for a very comfortable scale of living, but for building up a reasonable fortune. Thus the administration was purified and a better type of man attracted; while the provision of justice was strengthened by the creation of a supreme court of jurisdiction in 1773. The Indian finally required not merely just dealing, but to be left alone. It was characteristic of the Company that from the first it pursued a policy of religious toleration, or rather of religious protection and of non-interference with established customs, even with those that to western eyes seemed horrible and repulsive. There was no idea of employing natives in any position of trust, but the natives would not in any case have been either willing or able to co-operate with this benevolent alien despotism.

It is not to our purpose to give the details of the wars by which India was pacified. Lord Wellesley completed the work of Warren Hastings, by subduing Tippu, the Sultan of Mysore, in the south-west, and the Mahrattas who maintained a plundering military despotism in the centre;

and by bringing the Nizam of Haidarabad into a dependent alliance. Lord Hastings, by a further series of wars, consolidated our dominion, so that by 1820 British influence was supreme all over India with the exception of the basin of the Indus in the extreme north-west, where another twenty years were to elapse before the arduous Sikh wars extended it over that area also. India could already be regarded as a unit for concerted defence against the threats of a steadily encroaching Russia.

APPENDIX I

CONTEMPORARY RULERS

England.	*France.*	*Spain.*	*Russia.*	*Prussia.*	*The Empire.*
George III. (1760–1820).	Louis XVI. (1774–1789).	Charles III. (1759–1788).	Peter III. (1762).	Frederick II. (the Great) (1740–1786).	Joseph II. (1765–1790).
	The Republic (1792–1799).	Charles IV. (1788–1808).	Catharine II. (1762–1796).	Frederick William II. (1786–1797).	Leopold II. (1790–1792).
	The Consulate (1799–1804).		Paul I. (1796–1801).		Francis II. (1792–1806).
		Joseph Buonaparte (1808–1813).			
	Napoleon I. (1804–1814).	Ferdinand VII. (1808–1833).	Alexander I. (1801–1825).	Frederick William III. (1797–1840).	
George IV. (1820–1830).	Louis XVIII. (1814–1824).				

APPENDIX II

IMPORTANT EVENTS, 1760–1822

1760. Accession of George III.
1763. Peace of Paris.
1765. Isle of Man annexed to Great Britain.
Stamp Act.
1773. Warren Hastings becomes Governor-General of India.
1775. American War begins.
1776. Declaration of Independence.
1778. Death of Chatham.
War with France.
1779. Siege of Gibraltar.
1780. Gordon Riots.
1781. Battle of the Dogger Bank.
Surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown.
1782. Separation of America from England.
1783. Treaty of Versailles.
1784. Pitt becomes Prime Minister.
India Act.
1789. Triple Alliance for Defence of Turkey.
French Revolution.
1792. First Coalition against France.
1793. France declares War on England.
1794. Howe's Victory.
1798. Irish Rebellion.
Battle of the Nile.
1801. Union of Great Britain with Ireland.
Nelson's Victory at Copenhagen.
Peace of Amiens concluded.
1803. War against France under Bonaparte.
1805. Nelson's Victory and Death at Trafalgar.
1806. Death of Pitt.
Death of Charles James Fox.
1807. Abolition of Slave Trade.
Bombardment of Copenhagen.

1809. Victory and Death of Sir J. Moore.
Walcheren Expedition.
1810. Sir F. Burdett's arrest, and riots.
1811. Regent—The Prince of Wales.
Luddite Riots.
1812. War with America commenced.
1813. Battle of Vittoria.
1814. Peace with France.
Peace with America (Treaty of Ghent).
1815. Battle of Waterloo.
Peterloo.
1819. The Six Acts.
1820. Accession of George IV.
Cato Street Conspiracy.
Trial of Queen Caroline.
1822. Death of Castlereagh.

APPENDIX III

BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING

LECKY, W. E. H. *England in the Eighteenth Century.* A work of great learning and impartiality, especially full on Irish and Church matters.

HUNT, W. *History of England,* 1760–1801.

BRODRICK, G. C., and T K. FOTHERINGHAM. *History of England,* 1801–1837. A dull compilation.

GRANT ROBERTSON, C. *England under the Hanoverians.* Good chapters on social and industrial life.

——. *Select Statutes, Cases, and Documents.*

EGERTON, H. E. A. *Short History of British Colonial Policy.*

WILLIAMS, BASIL. *The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham.* The standard work.

ROSEBERY, EARL OF. *William Pitt.* (Twelve English Statesmen Series.) A brilliant monograph; not very satisfactory on Pitt as a war minister.

HOLLAND ROSE, J. *William Pitt and National Revival. William Pitt and the Great War.* Exhaustive studies from the records. Valuable accounts of the British Jacobins.

FORTESCUE, Sir JOHN. *British Statesmen of the Great War.* A gallery of brilliantly drawn and challenging portraits.

——. *Life of Wellington.*

MORLEY, LORD. *Burke.* (English Men of Letters Series.) A just and finely written appreciation.

COUPLAND, R. *Wilberforce: a Narrative.* A charming study of a charming personality.

——. *Sir Stamford Raffles.*

WALLAS, GRAHAM. *The Life of Francis Place.* This account of the Radical tailor gives interesting information about the extreme Reform party.

Cole, G. D. H. *Life of Cobbett.* A good account of one of the most individual figures in British history.

Walpole, Sir Spencer. *History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in* 1815. Vol. i. gives a fine survey of the general condition of the country and of its progress during the reign of George III.

Many of Lord Macaulay's most famous essays, and in one case the most misleading (on Warren Hastings), deal with this period. Those interested in military history will find Sir Charles Oman's *Wellington's Army* a mine of information.

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